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Essays on Multidimensional Private Information in the Consumer Credit Market
MeeRoo Kim
In these essays, I study how multidimensional private information causes advanta-
geous selection in a highly concentrated consumer credit market. All three chapters
are tightly correlated with each other. I first carefully investigate conditional correla-
tions between choices of a loan type, private default risks, and an additional private
information on consumption smoothing motives. I find that their conditional correla-
tions appear consistent with advantageous selection being driven by unobserved het-
erogeneity in consumption smoothing motives. Then I document how moral hazard
links two dimensions of private information: consumption smoothing motives and de-
fault risks. By separately identifying moral hazard from adverse selection, I show that
consumers with stronger consumption smoothing motives exert more effort to prevent
default, generating an endogenous negative association between consumption smooth-
ing motives and default risks. Finally, using a dynamic model of loan type choices and
following outcome of default, I recover the joint distribution of bi-dimensional unob-
served heterogeneity. This structural estimation also suggests a new way to estimate
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution that represents heterogeneous consumption
smoothing motives. As well as being consistent with the results of previous chapters,
the results of the structural estimation reveal a strong and positive correlation between
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and default risks.
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Introduction
Consumer credit markets have been broadly studied in economics. Especially, effective
policy design requires a clear understanding of asymmetric information in these markets,
so it has been extensively studied in the theory literature. However, empirical work is
still very limited. In particular, the potential sources and mechanisms of advantageous
selection in credit markets have not been studied yet; I will carefully investigate it in
my thesis.
I focus on the multidimensional private information that causes advantageous selec-
tion in the highly concentrated Korean consumer credit market. As I prove in my thesis,
this highly concentrated consumer credit market provides an environment in which an
additional dimension of unobserved heterogeneity may cause non-classical results.
Chapter 1 introduces a novel mechanism of advantageous selection in the highly
concentrated consumer credit market. I show that this advantageous selection is ex-
plained by the combination of two components: consumers’ unobserved heterogeneity
in consumption smoothing motives and banks’ sufficient market power. On the demand
side, consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives are willing to pay
a higher interest rate to smooth consumption. At the same time, they exert more ef-
fort to prevent default since their opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit
market is higher. On the supply side, sufficient market power allows banks to charge
a higher interest rate to those borrowers who are willing to pay more for consumption
smoothing. Using a theoretical model, I prove that advantageous selection may occur
only when the bank has market power. Then, I show that the empirical relationships
between a proxy for consumption smoothing motives, loan choices, and default risks
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appear consistent with advantageous selection being driven by private information on
consumption smoothing motives.
Chapter 2 conducts a deeper investigation into the moral hazard aspect of the re-
lationship between consumption smoothing motives and default risks. Advantageous
selection, which is reported in the first chapter, critically depends on the negative as-
sociation between consumption smoothing motives and default risks. My theoretical
model predicts that consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives have
higher opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit market, and will therefore ex-
ert more effort to prevent default. To empirically support this argument, I separately
identify moral hazard from adverse selection by exploiting panel data on delinquen-
cies and the existence of a convex penalty scheme on this rater. This increases the
marginal cost of future delinquencies as the number or duration of past delinquent
spells increases. Under this convex penalty scheme, a rational borrower who reacts to
the changes in incentives, the probability of being or remaining delinquent decreases as
the number or duration of past delinquent spells increases. I use both a nonparamet-
ric approach and a parametric approach to test the existence of moral hazard under
the convex penalty scheme. The results show a strong endogenous relationship be-
tween consumption smoothing motives and default risks: consumers who have stronger
consumption smoothing motives do indeed exert more effort to prevent default.
Chapter 3, which is joint work with Gustavo Pereira, tries to reveal a joint distribu-
tion of private information on default risks and consumption smoothing motives that
is represented by inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. Consumer credit markets
provide a fascinating environment to estimate inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
since inter-temporal consumption smoothing is the primary reason to join the consumer
credit markets. We consider the utility maximizing loan type choice of a rational, for-
ward looking borrower with stochastic default rate that is exogenous. The estimated
2
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is about 0.61, which is larger than the estimate
by Hall (1988), but is less than that by Attanasio and Weber (1993). The estimated
joint distribution reveals a strong and significant positive correlation between default
risks and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. This positive correlation is con-
sistent with the findings of the previous two chapters that consumers with stronger
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When consumers choose a loan from a menu where interest rates are paired with col-
lateral requirements in credit markets, existing theories predict that low risk borrowers
will be more willing to accept high collateral requirements for a reduction in interest
rates, compared to high risk borrowers (Bester (1985), Bester (1987), Besanko and
Thakor (1987a), Besanko and Thakor (1987b), Chan and Thakor (1987), Boot, Thakor
and Udell (1991)). Hence when consumers’ default risk is private information, these
theories predict a positive empirical correlation between a loan interest rate and default
probability, conditional on all the observable factors used for pricing the loans.
However, analyzing South Korean consumer credit market data, I find that con-
sumers who choose a loan with a high interest rate paired with a low collateral re-
quirement are less likely to default than those who choose a loan with a low interest
rate paired with a high collateral requirement. That is, I find evidence of advantageous
selection in the consumer credit market, a negative correlation between a loan interest
rate and default probability. On the contrary, looking at the corporate loan data, I do
not find any conspicuous evidence of asymmetric information between firms and the
bank.
One notable difference between the consumer loan market and the corporate loan
market in South Korea is the degree of market concentration. After the 1997 Asian
financial crisis, the Korean credit market underwent a huge consolidation initiated by
the governmental authority. This resulted in the consumer loan market that is much
more highly concentrated than the moderately concentrated corporate loan market.
The highly concentrated consumer loan market may serve as an environment in which
an additional dimension of unobserved heterogeneity may cause non-classical results, as
previously suggested by Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie´ and Salanie´ (2006) in the insurance
market setting.
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In this paper, I highlight one important source of the advantageous selection in
the non-competitive consumer credit market, namely unobserved heterogeneity in con-
sumption smoothing motives, and explore its mechanism. I first argue that consump-
tion smoothing motive is an important dimension of unobserved heterogeneity among
consumers. My arguments are motivated by some specific characteristics of the South
Korean consumer credit market as well as general theoretical considerations.
Consumers may use credit markets to smooth their inter-temporal consumption
by translating their consumption from periods of low marginal utility to periods of
high marginal utility. In addition, the consumption smoothing motives may be het-
erogeneous, as represented by the different curvatures of their utility functions. This
heterogeneity may be in general difficult to observe for banks, and is certainly not a
part of the factors used for loan pricing in this market.1
The unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives matters when
consumers choose their loan terms. After classifying consumers based on their observ-
able risk factors, a bank suggests a menu of contracts composed of pairs of an interest
rate and a collateral requirement, where the loan interest rate is decreasing in the value
of pledged collateral.2 Consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives
will tend to choose a high interest loan with a low collateral requirement. This is be-
cause their willingness to pay interest costs to reduce the collateral requirement by one
unit is higher than the willingness of those who are less motivated to smooth consump-
tion. Consumers may face some risk of defaulting against their will, in which case they
would lose their pledged collateral, potentially resulting in severe changes in their con-
sumption path. Hence those who derive larger disutility from a volatile consumption
1Jullien, Salanie´ and Salanie´ (2007) characterize the optimal menu of contracts when the agent’s
risk-aversion is his private information and point out that it is difficult for principal to precisely observe
agent’s risk-aversion.
2It is because the recovery, which is a portion of money recovered by the banks when default
occurs, increases with the value of pledged collateral. More details will be provided in chapter 4.
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path will be more willing to bear large interest costs instead of pledging high levels of
collateral.
Furthermore, the unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives can
generate differential incentives to prevent default. Given that consumers rely on the
credit market for consumption smoothing, their opportunity cost of being excluded from
the credit market increases with their consumption smoothing motives. Hence, if default
leads to exclusion from the credit market, consumers who are strongly motivated to
smooth consumption will exert more effort to avoid default. In other words, those who
enjoy greater utility gain from consumption smoothing suffer more from losing access
to the consumer credit market, and thus face a stronger incentive to avoid default by
honoring existing debts. These relationships between the unobserved heterogeneity in
consumption smoothing motives, loan choices, and default risks can drive advantageous
selection in the non-competitive consumer credit market (Figure 1.1 visualizes this
intuition.).
Importantly, the non-competitiveness of the credit market is required for the above
relationships to generate advantageous selection. In the competitive market, a bank has
to charge higher interest rates to the riskier borrowers.3 Otherwise, it will be profitable
for other banks to skim the cream off the lower risk borrows by offering a marginally
lower rate. On the other hand, under imperfect competition, hidden information on
consumption smoothing motives matters, since a bank is able to charge a higher interest
rate to the borrowers who are willing to pay to smooth consumption. I formalize this
idea in my model, proving that unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing
motives cannot cause a negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default
probability if the market is competitive and that it may cause a negative correlation
only when a bank has market power.
3In the competitive market, the value of hidden information on consumption smoothing motives
is private, in the sense that it has no impact on banks’ profit.
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I use a unique dataset from a major South Korean bank to show that the het-
erogeneity in consumption smoothing motives is a critical driver of the advantageous
selection. The dataset includes information not only on the loans from the bank, but
also on savings account balances and history of credit card consumption for each con-
sumer. One notable piece of information is the use of installment plans. This special
credit card feature that is widely available in South Korea allows consumers to split the
price of a good and repay over a number of months with some interest costs. One can
freely choose whether to exercise this option or not when making the initial purchase
of each good with her credit card. Essentially, it is a short-term loan that provides an
additional way to smooth consumption but with a high interest rate. Due to the high
interest rate, only the consumers who have strong consumption smoothing motives will
use the option.
Using this data, I construct a proxy for consumption smoothing motives. I cate-
gorize a group of consumers who have zero or small balance in their savings account,
upward savings trend or increasing income path, have borrowing constraints, and have
large amounts of debt in installment plans as those who are strongly motivated to
smooth consumption. I provide theoretical proofs for the validity of this proxy. Then,
I explicitly test that the consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives
tend to choose a credit loan that does not require any collateral but instead imposes a
high interest rate. At the same time, I show that those consumers tend to default less,
thereby explaining the negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default
probability.
I then explore the mechanisms of this relationship by examining different sub-groups.
Advantageous selection appears to be more conspicuous among repeated borrowers than
first-time borrowers. One possible explanation is that the bank may have better infor-
mation on unobserved default risk for the repeated borrowers, allowing it to concentrate
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on exploiting market power to charge a higher interest rate to those consumers who are
more willing to pay to smooth consumption, resulting in stronger patterns of advanta-
geous selection among repeated borrowers.
No clear relationship between an interest rate and default probability for the first-
time borrowers does not necessarily imply the lack of asymmetric information between
those borrowers and the bank. For the first-time borrowers, there is bi-dimensional
private information: one on consumption smoothing motives, and the other on default
risks.4 Under this bi-dimensional private information, two types of consumers choose
a credit loan that charges a higher interest rate instead of requiring any collateral:
borrowers who have unobservably stronger consumption smoothing motives and those
who have unobservably higher default risks. The first type of borrowers is less risky,
while the second type of borrowers is, of course, riskier than the bank predicts. Consis-
tent with this idea, I show that consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing
motives among the first-time borrowers still tend to choose a credit loan and are less
likely to default. This relationship alone would generate a negative correlation between
a loan interest rate and default probability. However, I find that the education level,
which is also an unpriced characteristic, generates a positive correlation between a loan
interest rate and default probability. Hence, private information on these factors can
lead to the disappearance of significant asymmetric information in the market.5
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that presents and investigates
a source of advantageous selection in the consumer credit market.6 Building on the
4Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show that riskier people buy more insurance but people who
have strong taste for insurance, who are relatively less risky, also buy insurance, resulting in absence
of a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence.
5This does not imply that this equilibrium is efficient as the first best allocation. In this equilibrium,
both unobservably high risk borrowers and borrowers who are less risky but with stronger consumption
smoothing motives pay the same interest rate. It implies that at least one group does not pay a fair
price.
6Davidoff and Welke (2004) find advantageous selection in the U.S. reverse mortgage market.
They argue that this advantageous selection might have come from heterogeneity in risk aversion
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ideas of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) who
introduce multidimensional heterogeneity to explain advantageous selection in the in-
surance markets, I propose that unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing
motives is a source of advantageous selection in the consumer credit market.
I also contribute to the growing empirical literature on detecting asymmetric infor-
mation in insurance markets and credit markets. Several papers empirically test for
existence of asymmetric information in insurance markets. The empirical results of the
tests are quite mixed. Puelz and Snow (1994), Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), Cohen
(2005), and He (2009) find evidence of asymmetric information in their markets, while
Cawley and Philipson (1999), Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000)7, and Cardon and Hendel
(2001) do not find any evidence of asymmetric information.
In terms of asymmetric information in credit markets, in addition to the papers that
try to separately identify moral hazard and adverse selection in credit markets (Ausubel
(1999), Karlan and Zinman (2009), Agarwal, Chomsisengphet and Liu (2010), Adams,
Einav and Levin (2009), Dobbie and Skiba (2013)), Davidoff and Welke (2004) find
advantageous selection in the U.S. reverse mortgage market. Agarwal, Chomsiseng-
phet and Liu (2016) find that less credit-worthy applicants are more likely to select
credit contracts with a lower collateral requirement and a higher interest rate in the
home equity loan market. Edelberg (2004) finds robust evidence of adverse selection
when high risk borrowers pledge less collateral and pay higher interest rates, even after
controlling for income levels, loan size, and risk aversion, and evidence of moral hazard.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 1.2 provides the
without presenting empirical evidence that risk aversion is the source of the advantageous selection.
Unlike Davidoff and Welke (2004), I introduce unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing
motives as a source of advantageous selection and present direct empirical evidence that the unobserved
heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives does cause advantageous selection in the highly
concentrated consumer credit market.
7In this paper, they also develop a general “positive correlation test” to check for the presence of
asymmetric information in a contractual relationship within a competitive market
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theoretical foundation showing that advantageous selection cannot occur unless banks
have market power. Chapter 1.3 describes the data. Chapter 1.4 provides empirical
evidence of advantageous selection in the Korean consumer credit market and discusses
the relevant features of the market. Chapter 1.5 concludes. The appendix provides
additional details and theoretical proofs.
1.2 Theoretical Foundation
In this chapter, I lay a theoretical foundation of advantageous selection. From a the-
oretical point of view, I introduce inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and
use it as a shortcut to represent heterogenous consumption smoothing motives.8 Con-
sumers with low IES have stronger consumption smoothing motives than consumers
with high IES.9 In turn, it implies that consumers with low IES tend to choose a high
interest rate loan paired with a low collateral requirement, and at the same time those
consumers are less likely to default.
In the following theoretical work, I show that the opportunity cost of being excluded
from the credit market is higher for the consumers with lower IES, i.e. the consumers
who have stronger consumption smoothing motives, using a simple two period model.
And then, more importantly, I show that unobserved heterogeneity in consumption
smoothing motives may generate advantageous selection only when the bank has market
power.
8I use this shortcut only for theoretical proofs. Consumption smoothing motive is a more general
concept than the one as represented by inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
9Several pieces of literature deal with heterogeneous IES. Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994)
and Attanasio and Browning (1995) suggest that rich households tend to show larger IES. Also
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) find larger IES for stockholders than for
non-stockholders. Bayoumi (1993) and Wirjanto (1995) indicate that liquidity constrained households
show smaller IES.
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Definition of IES and Heterogeneous Opportunity Cost of
Default
Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution measures consumers’ willingness to substitute
consumption between time periods in response to changes in the expected real interest
rate. If the real rate rises, current consumption may decrease due to increased return
on savings. At the same time, current consumption may also increase as the consumer
decides to consume more immediately, as she feels richer. The net effect on current
consumption is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.10
Definition and Implication of IES
Mathematically, inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) equals the minus of the
inverse of the elasticity of the marginal utility:
IES = − d log(ct)
d log(u′(ct))
where ct is the consumption in period t. This is general, in that it is unambiguous
even if a consumer has a non-homothetic preference.11
Under homothetic preferences, the above definition of IES is equivalent to Hall
(1988)’s definition of the elasticity of the consumption ratio to the corresponding rel-
ative price. That is to say, it is a measure of responsiveness of the growth rate of
consumption to the gross real interest rate. In this case, the mathematical definition
of IES becomes
10 Hall (1988)
11Under time separable von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, risk aversion and
IES have a one-to-one relationship: IES is the inverse of risk aversion. However, two parameters
have different meanings. Risk aversion represents preference toward risk under uncertainty, while IES





where ct is the consumption in period t, and where R = 1 + r is the gross real
interest rate.
If the preference is time separable, U =
∑T
t=0 β
tu(ct), the Euler equation u
′(ct) =
βRu′(ct+1) is derived from the utility optimization of the consumer under certainty. If
I take logarithms in the Euler equation, logR = − log u′(ct+1)





= − d log(ct+1/ct)
d log u′(ct+1)/u′(ct)
So, if I additionally assume iso-elastic utility function, u(ct) =
c1−γt −1
1−γ , then IES =
1/γ. In sum, the larger value of the parameter γ implies the smaller IES.
From a theoretical point of view, IES is a useful shortcut for consumption smoothing
motives. Consumers with low IES tend to adhere to their original target consumption
growth path, even when the price (the interest rate) changes, implying stronger con-
sumption smoothing motives than consumers with high IES.
In turn, it implies that consumers with low IES are more willing to bear higher
interest rates to reduce a collateral requirement as opposed to those consumers with high
IES.12 As a result, consumers with low IES, who have stronger consumption smoothing
motives, tend to choose a credit loan that charges a higher interest rate instead of
requiring any collateral.
12Just as, in insurance markets, risk averse people are more willing to pay higher premium to get
higher coverage.
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Heterogeneous Opportunity Cost of Default
In addition to this tendency of choosing a credit loan, consumers with low IES are
less likely to default. Consumers with heterogenous IES, representing differential con-
sumption smoothing motives, have differential incentives to prevent default since their
opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit market varies according to their
IES. Consumers with low IES exert more costly effort to avoid default since their op-
portunity cost of being excluded from the credit market is higher. In other words, those
who enjoy a bigger utility gain from consumption smoothing suffer more from denial
of access to the consumer credit market, and thus face a stronger incentive to avoid
default by honoring existing debts.
In Appendix A.1, I use a simple two-period model to prove the above argument
theoretically. The basic steps and ideas are as follows. As a first step, I show that the
optimal borrowing amount decreases in the IES. That is to say, a consumer with low
IES tends to borrow more from a bank at any given interest rate. As a second step, I
show more directly that the compensating income variation, which would be required
for the consumer to become indifferent to autarky, is larger for the consumer with lower
IES. Please refer to the appendix for the full model.
The theoretical model implies that heterogeneity in IES can be an important di-
mension that may cause a negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default
probability in the consumer credit market. Consumers with low IES tend to choose a
high interest rate loan with a low collateral requirement and, at the same time, they are
less likely to default, generating advantageous selection in the consumer credit market.
However, this additional dimension matters only when the bank has market power.
If the market is competitive, the information value of the unobserved IES is private,
i.e. it does not have an impact on the bank’s profit. In the next section, I elaborate on
this point theoretically in a quite general setting.
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Credit Market Model
Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie´ and Salanie´ (2006) show that even if there is an additional
dimension of unobserved heterogeneity that is positively correlated to insurance demand
and negatively correlated to accident risk, the additional dimension cannot generate a
negative correlation between coverage and accident risk if the market is competitive.
Similarly, here I show that when a menu is composed of pairs of loan interest rates and
collateral requirements in the consumer credit market, the unobserved heterogeneity in
IES may cause a negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability
only when the bank has market power.
In the first part of the model, I will verify conditions under which a positive cor-
relation between a loan interest rate and default probability is expected in the credit
market. And then, I find conditions under which a negative correlation between a loan
interest rate and default probability may be observed.
Competitive Market
Consider a consumer who chooses a contract from a given menu in the credit market.
Here the menu is composed of pairs of loan interest rates and collateral requirements.
Banks sort consumers based on observables X to predict their default risk, and then
suggest the menu of contracts to them based on the classification. Since I focus on the
choices of consumers in the credit market, I consider a group of consumers who are in-
distinguishable with respect to observables over which the bank can price discriminate.
I omit X for convenience.
Formally, a contract (Ci) is composed of a gross interest rate (Ri = 1 + ri) and col-
lateral (Di), i.e. Ci = (Ri, Di).
13 Suppose that a consumer, characterized by parameter
13I do not consider the credit rationing issue here. Some previous papers include the rationing
probability in the contract term. Also this argument assumes that the amount of loan (L) is fixed
whatever contract they choose. Refer to the small loan argument.
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θ, has the future income w which is distributed Fθ(w) with the support of [0,∞). The
parameter θ, therefore the income distribution Fθ(w), is the source of private informa-
tion. A borrower with parameter θ privately chooses income distribution Fθ(w) from a
set F . If the set F is a singleton, then it means that this is a pure adverse selection
model. Otherwise it allows borrowers to choose the level of effort to prevent default.
(moral hazard)
A borrower has wealth D0, which can be pledged but cannot be liquidized instantly.
Generally, with a fixed loan amount (L), when the value of pledged collateral (Di)
increases, applied interest rate (Ri) decreases whenever Di < RiL.
14 This is because,
for the bank, the cost of default decreases as the value of pledged collateral increases,
until the value is just equal to the amount of loan.
Here I list three behavioral assumptions that I suppose on the borrowers in this
model.
Behavioral Assumptions
Assumption 1. Each consumer’s preference is state independent over the distribu-
tion of the final wealth and monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
Assumption 2. Consumers are averse to mean-preserving spreads on future
wealth. (a weak preference for inter-temporal smoothing)
Assumption 3. (“Realistic Expectations”) When consumers choose a contract,
they precisely expect their default probability and distribution of wealth loss.
These assumptions are so weak that the result covers a large class of models. It
14It is consistent with usual loan contracts.
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not only does not depend on single crossing condition but also allows heterogeneous
preferences and even non-expected utility.
Suppose that a borrower prefers contract C1 to C2 which requests less collateral
than contract C1; D1 > D2. This implies that the price of the contract C1, i.e. interest
rate R1, is lower than that of C2, enough to compensate for the difference in collateral
requirements.
Default occurs if w < RiL.
15 When default occurs, a bank liquidizes the pledged
collateral and then allots liquidized collateral and income w for the repayment of debt.
After that the bank returns the balance to the borrower, if any.16 So the final wealth
of the borrower becomes
Wi(w) = max{D0 −Di, w −RiL+D0} = w −RiL+D0 +Qi(w)
which is a non-decreasing function in w where,
Qi(w) =

−w +RiL−Di if w < RiL−Di
0 if w ≥ RiL−Di
= max{−w +RiL−Di, 0}
Note that Qi(w) is the part of the debt that the borrower cannot repay.
Now let’s see how Q2(w)−Q1(w) behaves. Let’s set w¯i ≡ RiL−Di
15Here I consider the case that in both contracts, Di < RiL. If, in both contracts, Di ≥ RiL then
the final wealth Wi(w) = w¯f +D0 −w −RL, ∀w ∈ [0, w¯f ]. Note that, in this case, the final wealth is
the same in both contracts. This is because I assumed Ri does not decrease any more after Di ≥ RiL.
If I assume that Ri still decrease even after Di ≥ RiL, then contract C1 dominates contract C2 in
terms of first order stochastic dominance in final wealth. Actually, if D2 ≥ R1L then contract C1
always first order stochastic dominates C2. As a result, C2 will never be chosen in the market. So I
only consider the case D2 < R1L. Of course some steps are different but the results still hold.
16Here, I do not consider the collateral disparity issue like in Barro (1976), i.e. I assume that the




(R2 −R1)L+ (D1 −D2) if w < w¯1
−w +R2L−D2 if w¯1 ≤ w < w¯2
0 if w ≥ w¯2
So as w increases, Q2(w) − Q1(w) is non-increasing. As a results, W2(w) −W1(w)
is non-increasing.
Explicitly, W2(w)−W1(w) = (R1 −R2)L+Q2(w)−Q1(w) is,
W2(w)−W1(w) =

D1 −D2 if w < w¯1
−w +R1L−D2 if w¯1 ≤ w < w¯2
(R1 −R2)L if w ≥ w¯2
Since Wi(w) is non-decreasing function in w, and since W2(w) − W1(w) is non-
increasing function in w, W1(w) − EW1(w) is a mean-preserving spread of W2(w) −
EW2(w).
17
Since the borrower prefers C1 to C2, and since the borrower is averse to the mean-
preserving spread in future wealth by Assumption 2, E1W1(w) should not be smaller
than E1W2(w).
18 Otherwise, it contradicts the Assumption 1. As a result, we can
immediately get the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
Suppose a loan contract C2 requests less collateral than C1, and suppose both con-
tracts are sold to borrowers who are indistinguishable with respect to observables over
which the bank can price discriminate. Then under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2,
17This is a well-known result. The proof will be provided upon request.
18This expectation is calculated in the aspect of the borrower who choose contract C1.
18




The result in Proposition 1 provides a test that does not rely on the market structure.
However, it does not translate into a correlation structure between a loan interest
rate and default probability. It is because the non-negative correlation between a
loan interest rate and default probability can not be established independently of the
competitive context or the information structure. Hence, from now on I consider the
competitive market structure to recover the non-negative correlation.
I define the profit function of the firm Πi(w) = Si(w)− (1 + k)L where k is riskless
interest rate and Si(w) is,
Si(w) =

w +Di if w < RiL−Di
RiL if w ≥ RiL−Di
There is no general consensus on the definition of competitive equilibrium under
asymmetric information. Here, I use the non-decreasing profit (NDP) condition as a
concept of competitive equilibrium under asymmetric information. It means that profit





NDP condition is so weak that it covers almost all existing equilibrium concepts with
asymmetric information. It covers the concept of zero profit competitive equilibrium
(Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)), which implies that the profit of every contract to be
zero. Also it covers the cross-subsidy model (Miyazaki (1977)) in which the losses made
on the less powered contract (credit loan) are subsidized by the profit stemming from
the high powered contract (collateralized loan).19
19In cross-subsidy equilibrium, a bank taxes low risk people to subsidize high risk people. As a
19






So by combining inequalities (1.1) and (1.2), I get Proposition 2.
Proposition 2.
Suppose a loan contract C2 requests less collateral than C1 and both contracts are
sold to borrowers who are indistinguishable with respect to observables over which the






Interpretation of the inequality (1.3) is as follows. Assume that w ∈ {0, w˜} and
that w˜ ≥ R2L−D2. There are two contracts C1 and C2 which requires less collateral
than C1.
(R2L−D2)p2 ≥ (R2L−D2)p1
where, pi is the probability of default under each contracts.
Since R2L−D2 > 0, I get p2 ≥ p1. In other words, default probability is higher in the
contract that requires less collateral, i.e. a higher interest rate. This gives the positive
correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability in the competitive credit
market, regardless of the existence of the unobserved IES.
result, low risk people pay more interest rate than is fair, while high risk people pay less interest rate
than is fair and they still get the loan without any collateral requirement. Low risk people accept this




Now, suppose that the bank has market power. I need two conditions for the positive
correlation property to hold.20
Assumption 4. The borrowers have a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
Assumption 5. Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution of all agents is the same
or fully observed by the bank if heterogeneous, and the bank can use the information
when pricing the contract.
If Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 are satisfied, the utility function is determined
up to an affine transformation:
There exist functions v(W ), aθ, and cθ such that, for any θ, one can write
uθ(W,F ) = aθ(F )v(W )− cθ(F )
with aθ(F ) > 0.
Now suppose that the contracts C1 and C2 are chosen in equilibrium by some bor-







where, vi(w) = v(Wi(w)). From the two inequalities (1.4) and (1.5), I get∫
(v2(w)− v1(w))(dF2(w)− dF1(w)) ≥ 0 (1.6)
Since W2(w)−W1(w) is non-increasing in w, (v2(w)− v1(w)) is non-increasing. So the
equation implies F2 puts more weight on low w (when the default is likely to occur).
20These conditions are adopted from Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie´ and Salanie´ (2006)
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To interpret the inequality (1.6) consider the case when w ∈ {0, w˜}, where w˜ ≥ R2L.
Then, I get p2 ≥ p1, which gives the positive correlation between an interest rate and
default rate.
However, if the individual IES is not observed, then the above result does not hold.
Consider a simple example. Suppose that there are two types of borrowers: high IES
and low IES (whose default risk is the same). And suppose that there are two states
in the world: w = 0 (default) w = w¯ ≥ R2L (non-default). Then in the monopoly
contract, the bank will attract the borrower with low IES by suggesting the contract
that requires less collateral (high interest rate), while attracting the high IES borrower
by suggesting the contract that requires more collateral (low interest rate). Now let
me introduce an infinitesimal difference in risk that is perfectly correlated with IES. If
IES and the default risk are positively correlated, then I get the negative correlation
between loan interest rate and default probability.
In sum, I may find a negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default
probability only when the bank has market power and the IES is unobserved by the
bank. In the next section, I provide evidence that the bank did indeed have quite strong
market power in the data period.
1.3 The Data
Market Concentration
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Korean credit market underwent a huge con-
solidation initiated by the governmental authority. In the consumer loan market, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)21 rose from 835.6 to 2,262.7 between the year 1995





i , where si is the market share of firm i in percent unit, and N is the number of
firms. The HHI can range from close to 0 to 10,000.
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in the corporate loan market.22 It implies that the consumer loan market are highly
concentrated and the corporate loan market are moderately concentrated, according
to the standard suggested by the U.S. Department of Justice.23 Especially for con-
sumer loans, the market share of the bank that provided my dataset is about 42.6%
in year 2002.24 Through the data period, the bank maintained its market power for
consumer loans except for small fluctuations,25 while corporate loan market becomes
competitive. The highly concentrated consumer loan market, as I proved in the previ-
ous section, provides an environment in which an additional dimension of heterogeneity
may cause non-classical results.
Data Summary
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics of the corporate loan data that is provided by a
large commercial bank in Korea. The data is comprised of firm level corporate loans
initiated between January 2005 and December 2008. For each loan, the data contains its
history from the initiation date till November 2011. The data includes credit ratings of
the firms and firm specific characteristics which are considered when pricing the loans.
In case of firm credit ratings, the bank totally depends on credit score and credit class
which is rated by a third party credit agency. The credit score is a numerical value
ranging from 0 to 999. As the credit score of a firm increases, its default rate decreases
22Lee and Lee (2005)
23The U.S. Department of Justice divides the spectrum of market concentration as measured by
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) into three regions.
(https://www.justice.gov/atr/15-concentration-and-market-shares)
• HHI ≤ 1000: Competitive Market
• 1000 < HHI ≤ 1800: Moderately Concentrated Market
• HHI > 1800: Highly Concentrated Market
24In terms of mutual installment deposit market, the market share of this bank comes close to
61.5% in year 2002 and corresponding HHI is 4,040.8.
25Please refer to Figure 1.2 for the table showing the full history of bank merging in Korea.
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in general. The firm level characteristics includes revenue, profit, asset, and debt of
each firms.
Table 1.2 shows descriptive statistics of the consumer loan data that is provided by
another large commercial bank in Korea. The data is comprised of individual consumer
loans initiated between April 2005 and May 2009. For each loan, the data contains its
history from the initiation date till May 2009.
One very unique feature of the consumer loan data is that it is merged with credit
card usage data and balance on savings account data by individual identification num-
bers. I observe that each consumer appearing in the loan data has credit card account
and savings account in the same bank, which allows to match individuals across the
loan data, the credit card data, and the savings data. This individual level matching
allows me to construct an individual level proxy for consumption smoothing motives
using credit card consumption pattern and balance of savings account.
As measures of consumer credit risk, I have credit score, credit class, behavior score,
and introducing score. As in the corporate credit market, credit score and credit class
are rated by a third party agency and are most widely used in the consumer credit
market. Behavior score is similar to the credit score but evaluated by the bank itself
rather than by a third party agency. The bank observes the behavior of the borrower
and updates the behavior score over time. Behavior score is more frequently updated
than the credit score. Introducing score is only available for the first-time borrowers.
Since banks do not have enough credit information for the first-time borrowers, they ad-
ditionally build the introducing score. In addition to measuring credit, the introducing
score also allows me to identify who are the first-time borrowers.
I mainly analyze the bank loan data to find the evidence of advantageous selection.
Considering that the crucial feature of the tests for information asymmetries is to
compare observationally same consumers for the bank, it is important to condition
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on every observables used in pricing the loans. In that sense, this bank loan data is
unique. It incorporates not only credit rating variables such as credit score, credit class,
behavior score, and first score but also detailed consumer characteristics such as wage,
occupation, housing location, age, financial asset, and real estate. These comprehensive
set allows me to control all the observables used in pricing the loans.
Background: Menu of Contracts
After classifying consumers based on their observable risk factors, a bank suggests a
menu of contracts26 composed of pairs of interest rates and collateral requirements. A
borrower can choose whether to make a credit loan or a collateralized loan. There are
several options for collateralized loans in terms of what will be kept as a pledge, such
as real estate, savings, or warranty from a credit guarantee company.
The interest rate charged on a loan can be decomposed into an internal rate,27
education taxes,28 profit, and credit risk cost.29 Among them, the credit risk cost is the
source of the negative correlation between a loan interest rate and the value of pledged
collateral.
The credit risk cost is the expected cost of default for the bank, which is higher for
26Korean consumer credit market is exclusive : a bank can impose an exclusive relationship with a
borrower when they sign a contract. Whether the contract is exclusive or not is crucial in terms of the
possible set of contracts (Chiappori and Salanie´ (2013)). Under an exclusive contract, a convex price
scheme - a unit interest rate rises with a decrease in the collateral requirement - is possible. In Korea,
when a consumer borrows money from a bank, all of the loan information is registered to the Korea
Federation of Banks, which holds all borrower information. The other banks refer the information if
the consumer tries to borrow additional money. Usually, it is denied and, even when a loan limit is
very low with a higher interest rate is possible.
27The Korea Interbank Offered Rate, i.e. KORIBOR, or CD rate is usually used as an internal rate
in Korea. Here, KORIBOR is the average interest rate at which term deposits are offered between
prime banks in the Korean wholesale money market or interbank market. Basically, it is a Korean
version of Libor.
28This education tax is constant along the whole data period.
29Loan Interest Rate = Internal Rate + Tax + Credit Risk Cost + Profit. This is a rough formula.
The exact formula for the loan interest rate is kept secret by the banks.
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consumers with a higher expected default rate and is lower for loans with high recovery.
In turn, it means that a bank charges a higher interest rate to borrowers with lower
credit ratings, while it offers a lower interest rate for collateralized loans than for credit
loans, thereby generating a negative relationship between a loan interest rate and the
value of pledged collateral, given credit ratings.
This negative relationship is a quite general feature. Dey and Dunn (2007) em-
pirically show the negative correlation between the value of the pledged collateral by
borrowers and the interest rate charged by bank in the HELOC(Home Equity Line of
Credit) market.30
Table 1.3 explicitly shows the negative correlation between a loan interest rate and
value of pledged collateral in my dataset: the interest rate of credit loans is, on average,
1.88 percentage points higher than that of collateralized loans after conditioning on
observable factors used in pricing the loans.
A proxy for Consumption Smoothing Motives
In Korea, if a consumer purchases a good using her credit card, she needs to pay the
full balance of her credit card account at the end of the month (at the credit card
payment due). If she pays on time, she only needs to pay the price of the good without
any interest cost. Hence, using credit cards allows consumers to delay the payment.
However, if she does not pay all the balance at the credit card payment due, a penalty
interest rate is imposed to the residual balance and credit ratings become aggravated.31
30They support the sorting-by-private-information paradigm (borrowers who pledged higher
amounts of collateral signal their superior risk-types and therefore are rewarded with lower interest
rates by the bank) against the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm, which predicts a positive correlation
between collateral and borrower risk.
31In the United States, on the other hand, if a consumer pays the minimum payment due until the
due date, her credit ratings are not affected much. Minimum payment due is the amount which one
pays to avoid a late payment fee. Of course, the consumer needs to pay interest on the remaining
unpaid amount.
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In Korea, however, there is a unique credit card feature known as the installment
plan, which allows consumers to split the price of a good and repay through several
months with high interest cost. One can choose to participate in the plan or not when
purchasing a good by a credit card. Essentially, it is equivalent to making a short-term
loan but again with a high interest rate.
Here is an example of the installment plan. Suppose a consumer makes a $90
purchases using a 3-month installment contract with a monthly installment interest
rate rI . She needs to repay $(
90
3
+ 90× rI) in the first month, $(90
3
+ 60× rI) in the
second month, and $(
90
3
+ 30× rI) in the last month.
The installment contract, if she repays on time for 3 months, does not impact her
credit ratings at all. Hence, for consumers who cannot borrow money anymore, the
installment contract gives an additional way to smooth consumption.
Except for some special promotions,32 however, the yearly installment interest rate
is quite high: 10% ∼ 21.4%.33 Unless the willingness to pay the interest cost to smooth
consumption is high enough, consumers would not use the plan and would give up the
consumption smoothing.
From this concept, I can construct a proxy for consumption smoothing motives.
All consumers in my dataset received a loan from a bank. In Korea, it is very hard
to receive additional loans if someone already has outstanding debt. Even when it is
possible, the cost to receive an additional loan to buy some goods is very high. Hence,
those consumers who already received a loan from a bank are essentially unable to
borrow more. Now, consider a group of consumers who have zero or small balance in
their savings account, upward savings trend or increasing income path, and who can no
longer borrow money from the bank. If some of them use installment purchases, they
32I exclude these special promotions when I make a proxy for consumption smoothing motives.
33So the monthly installment interest rate is between 0.83% ∼ 1.78%, while the monthly savings
interest rate is about 0.25%.
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can be regarded as a group of consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing
motives, and in turn a group of consumers with lower IES from a theoretical point of
view. In Appendix A.2, I use a simple two-period model to theoretically show that the
proxy for consumption smoothing motives is valid. Please refer to the appendix for the
full proof.
1.4 Evidence of Advantageous Selection in the
Consumer Credit Market
In this section, I empirically show that, conditional on all the observables used for
pricing the loans, there indeed is a negative correlation between a loan interest rate
and default probability in the consumer loan market, while there is an insignificant
positive correlation in the corporate loan market.
To directly show that the unobserved consumption smoothing motives cause the
negative correlation in the consumer credit market, I use my proxy for consumption
smoothing motives. Using the proxy, I explicitly show that consumers who have strong
consumption smoothing motives tend to choose credit loans which charges a high in-
terest rate instead of requiring a high level of collateral. At the same time, I show that
those consumers are less risky, generating a negative correlation between a loan interest
rate and default probability.
I then subdivide the data into two groups; first-time borrowers and repeated bor-
rowers. By the subdivision, for the repeated borrowers, I show that the bank collects
more information on private default risks during the previous contract periods. It allows
the bank to concentrate on exploiting market power to charge a higher interest rate to
the consumers who are willing to pay to smooth consumption. On the other hand, for
the first-time borrowers, multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity generates opposite
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direction of correlations between loan interest rates and default rate, annihilating each
other. Hence, it results in seemingly no significant asymmetric information between
the first-time borrowers and the bank, which is not true.
For the empirical analysis, I use duration analysis. Duration measures the elapsed
time from the month of a loan initiation until, if any, its default. Duration is regarded
as right-censored if a spell ends without default by the end of either maturity or end of
an observation period. Generally, the hazard function is defined as follows.
h(t|x) = lim
→+0
P (t ≤ T < t+ |T ≥ t, x)

It can be used to approximate a conditional probability.
Especially, here I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model (PHM) using partial
maximum likelihood.
hi(t|x) = h0(t) exp(x′iβ)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard which is common to all units in the population.
Corporate Loans
Table 1.4 shows the partial maximum likelihood estimates of the Cox proportional
hazard model and least squares estimate of the linear probability model using corporate
loans data. For reference, the average default rate in the corporate loan market is about
0.64%.
Without controlling any observables, there is a positive correlation between a loan
interest rate and default hazard. A loan with 1 percentage point higher interest rate
has a higher default hazard rate by about 12.3% (exp(0.116)−1 ' 0.123). This is quite
natural in that the bank charges a higher interest rate to the firms that they believe
are riskier, i.e. to the firms with lower credit ratings.
However, once I control the observables used for pricing the loans, including credit
ratings and firm characteristics, I could only find a insignificant positive correlation
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between a loan interest rate and default hazard rate. The estimate shows that a contract
with 1 percentage point higher interest rate has a higher default hazard rate by about
9.5%. More direct interpretation through the linear probability model says that the
default probability is 0.05 percentage points higher for a loan with 1 percentage point
higher interest rate.
The survival estimates from Cox proportional hazard model, Figure 1.3 and Figure
1.4, show these results graphically. Figure 1.3 graphically shows the unconditional
positive correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability. Figure 1.4
shows that, once I control observable factors that are considered when pricing the loans,
firms that choose a higher interest rate loan paired with a lower collateral requirement
have a lower survival rate, i.e. a higher default rate, at every point in time34
Although it is statistically insignificant, there are at least three possible causes of
the positive correlation. Firms with private information that they are riskier among
the firms that are indistinguishable with respect to observables over which the bank
can price discriminate choose a higher interest rate loan paired with a lower collateral
requirement to prevent losing much pledged collateral if they default. At the same
time, a higher interest rate induces firms to choose riskier projects with higher expected
payoffs when successful. On top of that, less collateral provides less incentive to prevent
default, resulting in the positive correlation between a loan interest rate and default
probability.
To check robustness of the non-existence of asymmetric information, I additionally
execute the “positive correlation test” following Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000). This
positive correlation test provides a robust way to test existence of asymmetric informa-
tion under a competitive market condition.35
34The survival function does not cross each other since I use Cox proportional hazard model.
35Note that the corporate loan market becomes competitive during the data period, which justifies
the validity of the positive correlation test.
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In the equations below, Di represents default status for each individual i: Di = 1
means that the borrower i defaults. Also, for each borrower i, ri is the interest rate of
the loan contract and Xi is the observables that are used for pricing the loan.
Di = 1(Xiα + ei > 0) (1.7)
ri = Xiβ + i (1.8)
I first estimate probit (1.7) and least squares (1.8), weighing each individual by the
number of months under the loan contract, wi. Then, I generate a test statistic, W ,
using the generalized residual eˆi and the least squares residual ˆi from the equation














Following Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault and Trognon (1987), under the null of
conditional independence cov(ei, i|Xi) = 0, W is distributed asymptotically as a χ2(1).
The result, W = 0.310, shows that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no
asymmetric information.36
Consumer Loans
Table 1.5 shows the partial maximum likelihood estimates of the Cox PHM using con-
sumer loans data. For reference, the average default probability is 4.2% in the consumer
credit market. As in the corporate loan case, there is an unconditional positive cor-
relation between a loan interest rate and default hazard. The reason, likewise in the
corporate loan case, is that the bank charges a higher interest rate to the consumers
whom they think riskier, i.e. consumers with lower credit ratings.
However, once I control observables used for pricing the loans, I do indeed find
a negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default hazard. That is to
3610% critical value of chi square distribution with degree of freedom 1 is χ20.10(1) = 2.706, and for
5%, it is χ20.05(1) = 3.841. Note that W = 0.310 is much less than those critical points.
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say, consumers who choose a higher interest rate loan paired with a lower collateral
requirement among available loans are less likely to default, indicating advantageous
selection in the market. A loan with 1 percentage point higher interest rate has a lower
default hazard rate by 3.9%. Again the linear probability model says that the default
probability is 0.44 percentage points lower, i.e. about 10% less default, for a loan with
1 percentage point higher interest rate.
The survival estimates from Cox proportional hazard model, Figure 1.5 and Figure
1.6, show these results graphically. Figure 1.5 graphically shows the unconditional
positive correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability. Figure 1.6
shows that, once I control observable factors that are considered when pricing the
loans, consumers who choose a higher interest rate loan paired with a lower collateral
requirement have higher survival rate, i.e. lower default rate, at every point in time.37
That is, it shows advantageous selection graphically.
The negative correlation only can be explained, as I already proved in the previous
model, when the bank has market power and when there is an unobserved heterogeneity
that is correlated to the contract choice and to the default behavior. The unobserved
heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives matters at this point. Consumers who
have stronger consumption smoothing motives tend to choose a pair of a higher interest
rate and lower collateral requirement. It is because their willingness to pay interest cost
to reduce the collateral requirement by one unit is higher than those who are relatively
weakly motivated to smooth consumption. At the same time, those consumers exert
more effort to reduce default probability, which will be more deeply studied in the
second part of the paper, since their opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit
market is higher, resulting in advantageous selection in the consumer credit market.
In the following empirical analysis using a proxy for consumption smoothing mo-
37The survival function does not cross each other since I use Cox proportional hazard model.
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tives, I explicitly show that consumers who have strong motives to smooth consumption
tend to choose a non-collateralized credit loan with a high interest rate and at the same
time they tend to default less, which generates the negative correlation between a loan
interest rate and default probability.
I subdivide the dataset into small loans (less than or equal to $20,000) and large
loans (larger than $20,000) and then focus on the small loans for two reasons.
First, a credit loan availability is limited to small loan sizes. In order to borrow a
large amount of money from the bank, consumers need to pledge high value collateral.
In that case, the contract choice may be driven not only by the tradeoff between a
loan interest rate and the value of pledged collateral but also by how large a loan the
borrower is requesting. This confounding factor can be removed if I focus on small
loans of amounts that are within the bank’s credit loan limit. The $20,000 cutoff is
conservative in that choice between a credit loan and a collateralized loan is available
for any amount under $20,000.
Second, often during the data period, Korean consumers use mortgage loans to buy
a second house as an investment rather than for consumption smoothing behavior. In
that case, only investors expecting high returns, which implies riskier investors, tend
to choose a credit loan which charges a higher interest rate. In that sense, I expect a
positive correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability among large
loans. Again, by focusing on the small loans, I try to exclude loans for investment
purpose and to concentrate on consumption smoothing behavior where the consumption
smoothing motives matter.
As intuition suggests, a negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default
probability becomes stronger (1st column of Table 1.6), while a positive correlation,
though statistically insignificant, appears (2nd column of Table 1.6) in large sized loans.
Before proceeding further, I need to check whether the negative correlation is ficti-
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tious or not. According to Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000), restricted functional forms,
forbidden cross effects, or nonlinear functions of the exogenous variables could drive
spurious asymmetric information results. Nonparametric estimation could be one so-
lution but I will confront the curse of dimensionality. Instead, from now on, I allow
full interactions among covariates and use the adaptive Lasso to choose the relevant
variables for all specifications.
Lasso tends to choose false positives, i.e. too many variables, unless one imposes
very strong conditions.38 Instead, here I use the adaptive Lasso to consistently select
the true active set of variables under relatively weak assumptions.39 Adaptive Lasso
identifies the right subset of true variables and reaches the oracle properties, i.e. it
performs as well as if the true underlying model were given in advance,40 assuming
compatibility condition (Zou (2006), and Bu¨hlmann and Geer (2011)). Here, with
Cox proportional hazard model, the adaptive Lasso solves the below problem, which
















T zi − log {
n∑
j=1
I(T˜j ≥ T˜i) exp (βT zj)}]
Here λ is the tuning parameter chosen through 10-fold cross validation41, and β˜ =
(β˜1, ..., β˜d)
T is the maximizer of the log partial likelihood ln(β).
38One of the restrictive condition is so called “irrepresentable condition” which is restrictive but
necessary to prevent false positive. Please see Zou (2006) or Zhao and Yu (2006) for the details.
39The compatibility condition is sufficient to achieve variable selection consistently through the
adaptive Lasso. For details of compatibility condition, please see Bu¨hlmann and Geer (2011). But it
is clear that very small coefficients cannot be chosen by any regularization method. To avoid these
very small coefficients, here I additionally assume so called “beta-min” conditions. The “beta-min”
condition requires some lower non-zero bound on the true coefficients.
40A fitting procedure has an oracle property if it identifies the right subset model and has the
optimal estimation rate.
41In k-fold cross-validation, the original sample is randomly partitioned into k equal sized sub-
samples. Of the k subsamples, a single subsample is retained as the validation data for testing the
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It is basically a two step procedure that penalizes those with lower absolute value
of initial estimates, |β˜j|, more. In the first step, I maximize log partial maximum
likelihood, ln(β), and get the initial estimates β˜j. In the second step, I minimize
equation (1.10) with the initial estimates β˜j. As is well know, because of the L1-
geometry (kinky penalty), the Lasso performs variable selection in that an estimated
component can be exactly zero. The number of variables that become exactly zero
depends on the magnitude of λ and |β˜j|. As one penalize more, i.e. higher λ, more
variables are estimated to be zero. Similarly, the procedure ends up penalizing more
those with lower initial estimates, |β˜j|.
Table 1.7 shows the same contents as in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 using the adaptive
lasso. The negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default hazard is little
bit weaker but it is still significant.
Now let me introduce consumption smoothing group dummy which captures un-
observed heterogeneity in strong consumption smoothing motives. The consumption
smoothing group dummy is a proxy for the unobserved consumption smoothing motives.
Consumers who have a increasing savings trend or increasing income path, and who
use an installment plan offered by their credit card company belong to the consump-
tion smoothing group. Those consumers are people who have stronger consumption
smoothing motives as I prove in the Appendix A.2. Table 1.8 compares observable
characteristics of the consumers who are in the consumption smoothing group with
those of the consumers who are outside of the group.
Table 1.9 shows the estimates of Cox proportional hazard model including inter-
actions between a loan interest rate and consumption smoothing group dummy. The
results show that for the consumers in the consumption smoothing group, a group
model, and the remaining k − 1 subsamples are used as training data. The cross-validation process is
then repeated k times (the folds), with each of the k subsamples used exactly once as the validation
data. The k results from the folds can then be averaged to produce a single estimation. 10-fold cross
validation is commonly used.
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of consumers who have relatively homogenous high consumption smoothing motives,
a negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default hazard become much
weaker (about 67%) and statistically insignificant, implying that once unobserved het-
erogeneity in consumption smoothing motives is controlled the negative correlation
between a loan interest rate and default hazard disappears. Also note that consumers
in the consumption smoothing group are much less likely to default: default hazard
decreases by about 57% (exp(−0.844)− 1 = −0.57).
From now on, let me try to provide more direct empirical evidence showing that
how unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives causes the negative
correlation between a loan interest rate and default hazard.
If consumers in the consumption smoothing group, a unpriced characteristic, tend
to choose a credit loan and, at the same time, if they are less likely to default, then it
signals the unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives is the source
of advantageous selection. To see this, consider the following model (Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006)). For illustration purpose, I use linear specification.
Let Xi be the set of observables used in pricing the loans for the consumer i. Also
Di and ri are default dummy and a loan interest rate respectively.
ri = Xiγ + ηi
Di = Xiβ + i
Under the null of symmetric information in the competitive market, i and ηi should
not be correlated: Cov(ri, Di|Xi) = 0. But what I found from the previous results is
that there is a negative correlation in the non-competitive consumer credit market:
Cov(ri, Di|Xi) < 0. It signals that there is an unobserved heterogeneity that affects
both contract choice and default behavior. In turn, it implies that both error terms
can be decomposed more.
Let Zi be the dummy of the consumption smoothing group: a group of consumers
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who have strong consumption smoothing motives.
ηi = ρ1Zi + νi
i = pi1Zi + µi
What I expect is that, for the consumers in the consumption smoothing group,
ρ1 > 0 (would tend to choose a higher interest rate loan paired with a lower collateral
requirement) and at the same time pi1 < 0 (would be less likely to default), which drives
the negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability.
The first two columns of the Table 1.10 show that consumers in the consumption
smoothing group, compared to those outside of the group, are more likely to choose a
credit loan by 9.1 percentage points. Again, noting that a credit loan charges a higher
interest rate than a collateralized loan, the consumers in the consumption smoothing
group tend to choose a higher interest rate loan as I expected.
At the same time, last two columns of the Table 1.10 show that the consumers in the
consumption smoothing group default 2.0 percentage points less than the consumers
outside of the group. Considering that default rate, on average, is about 4.2% in this
dataset, those consumers default about 50% less, which is a notable difference.
Further meaningful subdivision is to separate first-time borrowers and repeated
borrowers (see Table 1.11). The bank can collect more precise information on the
unobserved default risk during the contract periods. As a result, for the repeated
borrowers, the bank has better information on private default risk which facilitates
exploiting market power to charge a higher interest rate to the borrowers who are
willing to pay to smooth consumption. It results in significant advantageous selection
for the repeated borrowers.
However, for the first-time borrowers, there is not only unobserved heterogeneity
in consumption smoothing motives but also heterogeneity in default risks, caused by
unobserved income volatility and/or unobserved education level. One of the issues of
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multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity is that one of the unobserved factors gener-
ates a correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability in one direction,
while the other factors generate correlations between a loan interest rate and default
probability in the opposite direction. Then, those correlations in the opposite direction
annihilate each other. The private information on default risks is a source of a positive
correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability as classical theories
predict. It is because riskier borrowers avoid pledging a high level of collateral for a
reduction in an interest rate, while less risk borrowers choose to do so. This positive
correlation derived by private information on default risks annihilate the negative corre-
lation derived by private information on consumption smoothing motives as presented
in the first column of Table 1.11. It results in seemingly no significant asymmetric
information between the first-time borrowers and the bank. However, it does not imply
that there is no asymmetric information between the first-time borrowers and the bank
at all.
The first column of Table 1.12 shows that the consumers who have stronger con-
sumption smoothing motives, among the first-time borrowers, still tend to choose a
credit loan which charges a higher interest rate. At the same time, the second col-
umn of Table 1.12 show that those consumers among the first-time borrowers are 1.9
percentage points less likely to default. These two facts indicate that the unobserved
consumption smoothing motives alone should have generated a negative correlation be-
tween a loan interest rate and default probability. However, it has been neutralized by
a positive correlation between a loan interest rate and default probability derived by
other factors.
Here, I suggest two sources of the positive correlation between a loan interest rate
and default probability among the first-time borrowers. First, Table 1.13 shows that
consumers who prefer online banking tend to choose a collateralized loan and at the
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same time default less, which should have generated a positive correlation between a
loan interest rate and default probability, if it were not for unobserved heterogeneity in
consumption smoothing motives. Most probable intuition behind this phenomenon is as
follows. Usually only highly educated consumers utilize online banking system at that
time. Because, it has not been long since the online banking system has been introduced
in Korea.42 Although I control occupation and wage as exogenous variables, the residual
variation in education level generates a positive correlation between a loan interest rate
and default probability. These highly educated consumers have private information on
their default risks, which are relatively less risky. Hence, those consumers choose a
collateralized loan which charges lower rate.
On top of that, the bank suffers from unobserved heterogeneity in default risk
caused by income volatility more with the first-time borrowers. For each individual, I
measure the standard deviation of over time income profile. Table 1.14 shows that the
realized income volatility is higher for the first-time borrowers than that of repeated
borrowers condition on all the observables used for pricing the loans. A consumer whose
income path is more volatile, i.e. riskier, will choose credit loans to avoid losing pledged
collateral if she defaults, generating a positive correlation between a loan interest rate
and default probability. These two sources of the positive correlation annihilate the
negative correlation derived by unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing
motives, resulting in seemingly no significant asymmetric information between the bank
and the first-time borrowers.
Table 1.15 shows that, on average, the interest rate gap between credit loans and
collateralized loans is much higher for the repeated borrowers. It suggests that the bank
exploits the market power more efficiently with repeated borrowers by collecting more
42Three bank in Korea introduced the online banking system in July 1999. The system called
“Banktown” made by KT Commerce Solution is the first online banking system in Korea. And it is
propagated to other banks in early 2000s.
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information on consumers’ hidden types during the loan contract periods.43 It results
in even much stronger negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default
hazard among repeated borrowers.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
Classical adverse selection models of the credit market consider heterogeneity in risk
type as the sole source of adverse selection. It is reasonable since, in a competitive
setting, true risk matters to the uninformed party, even conditional on observables
considered when pricing the contracts, while other dimensions of heterogeneity does
not. Recent empirical findings in diverse insurance markets emphasize the role of risk
aversion as an additional source of heterogeneity. My empirical findings in the non-
competitive consumer credit market are closely related with those recent findings in
the insurance markets based on either alternative source of heterogeneity or multi-
dimensional heterogeneity.
By analyzing micro level data from the Korean corporate credit markets, I find weak
evidence or no evidence of positive relationship between a loan interest rate and the
default hazard once I control for all the observables considered when pricing the loans.
It might be because the Korean bank rather precisely prices the corporate loans based
on observable risk factors without leaving room for unobserved heterogeneity.
In the case of consumer loans, to the contrary, I find opposite results to what the
classical theories predicts. Consumers who borrow money at a higher interest rate are
not more but less likely to declare default once all the observables considered when
pricing the loans are controlled for, resulting in favorable selection rather than adverse
one. Finding favorable selection is unusual in the credit market, but it is not uncommon
43Comparing first and third column of Table 1.12 shows that the tendency of consumption smooth-
ing group to choose credit loans becomes stronger although the interest rate gap between credit loans
and collateralized loans becomes higher for the repeated borrowers (Table 1.15).
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in insurance markets. In insurance markets, although high risk consumers purchase
high coverage, highly risk averse consumers also purchase high coverage. Thus, in so
far as those who are more risk-averse are less risky, advantageous selection arises in the
insurance market as well as the classical adverse selection. In the insurance market,
due to these two opposite selection effects, the claim rates of those who purchase high
insurance coverage are not necessarily higher than the claim rates of those who purchase
low coverage. But again, it is important to emphasize that this advantageous selection
may occur only when the market is non-competitive.
Borrowing this kind of reasoning into the consumer credit market, I provide evidence
that unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives causes advantageous
selection in the consumer credit market. Since consumption smoothing is one of the
main reasons why consumers apply for consumer loans, consumers who are more eager
to smooth consumption borrow money even at a higher interest rate with a lower
collateral requirement. Those consumers are also more likely to pay back the debt for
fear of losing access to the future credit market and thus for fear of losing consumption
smoothing opportunities in the future.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics (Corporate Loans)
Mean S.D. Q1 Q3
Loan Interest Rate (%) 7.2 1.2 6.5 7.9
Credit Score 481.9 165.9 430 580
Amount of Loan (Million Dollars) 1.2 1.5 0.6 1.3
Asset (Million Dollars) 8.4 38.2 2.2 7.0
Revenue (Million Dollars) 8.5 25.3 1.5 7.8
Debt (Million Dollars) 6.0 29.3 1.7 5.3
Profit (Million Dollars) 0.6 2.3 0.1 0.5
Observations 5,755
Notes: S.D. means standard deviation, and Q1, Q3 mean the first and the
third quantile separately.
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics (Consumer Loan)
Mean S.D. Q1 Q3
Loan Interest Rate (%) 6.4 1.9 5.5 7.2
Maturity (Year) 16 8.5 10 20
Credit Score 790 75.5 752 841
Behavior Score 1094 85.4 1052 1145
Introducing Score 970.6 259.8 730 1148
Amount of Loan ($1,000) 46 65 4 60
Credit Loan Dummy 0.18 0.38 0 0
Number of Referring Credit State 0.0007 0.031 0 0
Observations 28,605
Notes: S.D. means standard deviation, and Q1, Q3 mean the first and the
third quantile separately. The number of observations is 26,667 in case of
Introducing Score since it is only available for first-time borrowers.
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Table 1.3: Interest Rate Gap between Credit Loans and Collateralized
Loans
Consumer Loans OLS
Dependent Variable Loan Interest Rate




Allow Full Interactions Yes
Adaptive lasso has been used to pick the relevant conditional variables.
Observations 14,480
Notes: Table reports the least squares estimates. Credit ratings includes all the credit
rating variables that the bank uses when pricing the loans. It includes credit score
and credit class which is provided by a third party credit rating company, and also
includes behavior score and first score which are rated by the bank itself. Consumer
characteristics includes income, occupation, location, real estate, previous bank loan
amount, number of previous loans, and whether she is the owner or the renter of her
house. I allow full interaction among the covariates and use adaptive lasso to pick the
relevant variables.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: Consumer Loans (Small Loans V.S. Large Loans)
Cox PHM
Dependent Variables Default Hazard
Consumer Loans Less than or Equal to $20,000 Larger than $20,000
Loan interest rate −0.055*** 0.064
(0.013) (0.047)
Credit Ratings Yes Yes
Consumer Characteristics Yes Yes
Observations 14,480 14,125
Notes: Table reports the partial likelihood estimates of the Cox proportional hazard model. Credit
ratings includes all the credit rating variables that the bank uses when pricing the loans. It includes
credit score and credit class which is provided by a third party credit rating company, and also
includes behavior score and first score which are rated by the bank itself. Consumer characteristics
includes income, occupation, location, real estate, previous bank loan amount, number of previous
loan, and whether she is the owner or the renter of her house.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.7: Consumer Loans (Using Adaptive Lasso)
Cox PHM
Dependent Variable Default Hazard
Consumer Loans Full Sample ≤ $20,000 > $20,000
Loan interest rate (%) −0.027** −0.039*** 0.070
(0.012) (0.013) (0.055)
Credit Ratings Yes Yes Yes
Consumer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Allow Full Interactions Yes Yes Yes
Adaptive lasso has been used to pick the relevant conditional variables.
Observations 28,605 14,480 14,125
Notes: Table reports the partial likelihood estimates of the Cox proportional hazard
model. Credit ratings includes all the credit rating variables that the bank uses when
pricing the loans. It includes credit score and credit class which is provided by a third
party credit rating company, and also includes behavior score and first score which
are rated by the bank itself. Consumer characteristics includes income, occupation,
location, real estate, previous bank loan amount, number of previous loan, and whether
she is the owner or the renter of her house. I allow full interaction among the covariates
and use adaptive lasso to pick the relevant variables.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
46
Table 1.8: Summary Statistics of Consumption Smoothing Group
Consumption Smoothing Group No Yes
Observations 25,379 3,226
Proportion of Men (%) 60.1 58.5
House Owner (%) 62.4 71.0
Online Transaction Preferred (%) 4.7 4.2
Avg. of Loan Maturity (Month) 15.9 17.4









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.11: First-time Borrowers V.S. Repeated Borrowers
Cox PHM
Dependent Variable Default Hazard
Consumer Loans First-time Borrowers Repeated Borrowers
Loan interest rate 0.020 −0.157***
(0.017) (0.057)
Credit Ratings Yes Yes
Consumer Characteristics Yes Yes
Allow Full Interactions Yes Yes
Adaptive lasso has been used to pick the relevant conditional variables.
Observations 13,581 899
Notes: Table reports the partial likelihood estimates of the Cox proportional hazard
model. Credit ratings includes all the credit rating variables that the bank uses when
pricing the loans. It includes credit score and credit class which is provided by a third
party credit rating company, and also includes behavior score and first score which
are rated by the bank itself. Consumer characteristics includes income, occupation,
location, real estate, previous bank loan amount, number of previous loan, and whether
she is the owner or the renter of her house. I allow full interaction among the covariates
and use adaptive lasso to pick the relevant variables.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.13: Contract Choices of Internet Banking Prefer Group among First-time Bor-
rowers
OLS
Consumer Loans First-time Borrowers
Dependent Variable Credit Loan Dummy Default Dummy
Online Banking Prefer Group −0.026** −0.028***
(0.011) (0.007)
Credit Ratings Yes Yes
Consumer Characteristics Yes Yes
Allow Full Interactions Yes Yes
Adaptive lasso has been used to pick the relevant conditional variables.
Observations 13,581 13,581
Notes: Table reports the least squares estimates. Credit ratings includes all the credit
rating variables that the bank uses when pricing the loans. It includes credit score
and credit class which is provided by a third party credit rating company, and also
includes behavior score and first score which are rated by the bank itself. Consumer
characteristics includes income, occupation, location, real estate, previous bank loan
amount, number of previous loan, and whether she is the owner or the renter of her
house. I allow full interaction among the covariates and use adaptive lasso to pick the
relevant variables.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: Compare Income Volatility: First-time Borrowers V.S Repeated Borrowers
Consumer Loans OLS





Allow Full Interactions Yes
Adaptive lasso has been used to pick the relevant conditional variables.
Observations 28,605
Notes: Table reports the least squares estimates. Credit ratings includes all the credit
rating variables that the bank uses when pricing the loans. It includes credit score
and credit class which is provided by a third party credit rating company, and also
includes behavior score and first score which are rated by the bank itself. Consumer
characteristics includes income, occupation, location, real estate, previous bank loan
amount, number of previous loan, and whether she is the owner or the renter of her
house. I allow full interaction among the covariates and use adaptive lasso to pick the
relevant variables.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.15: Interest Rate Gap between Credit and Collateralized Loans: First-time
V.S. Repeated
OLS
Dependent Variable Loan Interest Rate
Consumer Loans First-time Borrowers Repeated Borrowers
Credit Loan Dummy 1.25*** 5.03***
(0.07) (0.66)
Credit Ratings Yes Yes
Consumer Characteristics Yes Yes
Allow Full Interactions Yes Yes
Adaptive lasso has been used to pick the relevant conditional variables.
Observations 13,581 899
Notes: Table reports the least squares estimates. Credit ratings includes all the credit
rating variables that the bank uses when pricing the loans. It includes credit score
and credit class which is provided by a third party credit rating company, and also
includes behavior score and first score which are rated by the bank itself. Consumer
characteristics includes income, occupation, location, real estate, previous bank loan
amount, number of previous loan, and whether she is the owner or the renter of her
house. I allow full interaction among the covariates and use adaptive lasso to pick the
relevant variables.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Recently there have been several contributions about advantageous selection in insur-
ance markets (Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008)).1
What they mean by advantageous selection is that there is a negative correlation be-
tween the choice of coverage and ex-post risk. They have argued that it can arise by
these sources: more risk averse people are more likely to join the long-term care in-
surance market and at the same time are less likely to utilize it; or people with better
cognitive ability are more likely to join the Medigap insurance market but on the con-
trary bring about lower costs for the insurance company. One remarkable point is that
advantageous selection has been explained by introducing the concept of multidimen-
sional private information.
These literature has shown that empirical relationships between an additional di-
mension of unobserved heterogeneity, choices of a contract type, and ex-post risks may
lead to advantageous selection in imperfectly competitive markets. However, there is
one remaining question on what is the channel that drives the association between an
additional dimension of unobserved heterogeneity and risks.
In this chapter, I try to explicitly reveal the moral hazard aspect of the relation-
ship between the additional dimension of unobserved heterogeneity in consumption
smoothing motives and default risks, which is one of the necessary channels that drive
advantageous selection in the consumer credit market that I documented in chapter 1.
In the previous chapter of my dissertation, I provide evidence of advantageous selec-
tion in the highly concentrated Korean consumer credit market. Highly concentrated
consumer credit markets provide an environment in which the additional dimension,
other than default risk, may play an important role to drive advantageous selection. It
1Davidoff and Welke (2004) suggest risk aversion as a source of advantageous selection in the
U.S. reverse mortgage market. However, they did not provide any empirical evidence to support the
argument.
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is because imperfect competition allows a bank to charge a higher interest rate to the
borrowers who are willing to pay to smooth consumption.2
In this market, consumers who choose a loan with a high interest rate paired with
a low collateral requirement are less likely to default than those who choose a loan
with a low interest rate paired with a high collateral requirement. To explain this
negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default hazard rate, I introduced
unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives.
First, the unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives affects choices
of loan terms. Consumers with stronger consumption smoothing motives tend to choose
a high interest rate loan paired with a low collateral requirement. Second, at the same
time, the unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives can generate
differential incentives to prevent default, the argument that will be empirically tested
in this paper.
Given that consumers rely on the credit market for consumption smoothing, their
opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit market increases with their desire
to smooth inter-temporal consumption. Hence, if default leads to exclusion from the
credit market, consumers who are strongly motivated to smooth consumption will exert
more effort to avoid default. In other words, those who enjoy a greater utility gain from
consumption smoothing suffer more from losing access to the consumer credit market,
and thus face a stronger incentive to avoid default by honoring existing debts.
These relationships between the unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smooth-
ing motives, loan choices, and default risks can drive advantageous selection in an
imperfectly competitive consumer credit market.3
However, the previous chapter only provided correlational evidence that those con-
2While in the competitive market, the value of hidden information on consumption smoothing
motives is private, in the sense that it has no impact on banks’ profit. Please refer to chapter 1
“Credit Market Model” for details.
3Figure 2.18 in the appendix visualizes the intuition.
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sumers are less likely to default, by establishing a negative empirical association between
consumption smoothing motives and the probability of default.
There are two possible hypotheses regarding this association. The first hypothe-
sis is bi-dimensional self-selection; consumers differ in two characteristics, consump-
tion smoothing motives and default risk, and they exogenously negatively associated.
The second hypothesis, which I support, is that there exists moral hazard as well as
uni-dimensional self-selection; consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing
motives choose loans with higher interest rates, and they also face higher incentives
to prevent default due to the same concerns about consumption smoothing. These
consumers exert more effort to avoid default, generating an endogenous negative asso-
ciation between consumption smoothing motives and default risks.
It is important to distinguish these two plausible stories to get precise policy impli-
cations in the credit market. If only adverse selection exists, the problem can be solved
by loan guarantees and/or improved screening processes. On the other hand, if there
exists moral hazard, policymakers and the bank should consider legal reforms regarding
limited access to effective recourse and should consider improving dynamic contracting
schemes to fully account for the incentives to prevent default.
To empirically support the second hypothesis, I separately identify moral hazard
from adverse selection by using panel data on delinquencies. Notably, I exploit the
dynamic features of the loan contracts under which these delinquencies occur. The
loan contracts have a convex penalty scheme in which the penalty increases as the
number and/or duration of past delinquent spells increases. That is, every increase
in either the number or the duration of past delinquent spells contributes to an even
higher marginal cost of a future delinquency. This provides additional incentive for a
delinquent borrower to prevent future delinquencies. If I find evidence that borrowers
react to these changes in incentives, it indicates the existence of moral hazard.
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Econometrically, finding such evidence involves identifying the patterns of negative
occurrence dependence and negative lagged duration dependence in the data. Nega-
tive occurrence dependence is defined as having a larger number of previous delinquent
spells reduces the probability that a borrower will become or remain delinquent. Sim-
ilarly, negative lagged duration dependence is defined as having longer duration of
previous delinquent spells reduces the probability that a borrower will become or re-
main delinquent.4 Since, under the convex penalty scheme, the marginal cost of future
delinquency increases with the number and/or duration of past delinquent spells, the
behaviors of a rational borrower would exhibit negative occurrence dependence and
negative lagged duration dependence.
One critical hurdle to identify negative occurrence dependence and/or negative
lagged duration dependence is to properly condition on unobservable characteristics
that cause the effects of dynamic selection. If one fails to distinguish pure heterogene-
ity and state dependence, then it is more likely to find positive occurrence dependence
and/or positive lagged duration dependence. For example, borrowers with a history of
many delinquencies reveal their bad risk types for unobserved reasons. In turn, these
borrowers with bad risk types also are more likely to be delinquent in the future, which
generate positive occurrence dependence. In sum, it is important for identification to
separate pure heterogeneity with state dependence, which can be attained by exploiting
panel data on delinquencies.
I first employ the nonparametric tests developed by Abbring, Chiappori and Pin-
quet (2003) to identify negative occurrence dependence. Then, I employ the parametric
approach by Doiron and Gørgens (2008) to identify both negative occurrence depen-
dence and negative lagged duration dependence. The results of nonparametric tests
show that there is negative occurrence dependence and it is more pronounced among
4These definitions follow Heckman and Borjas (1980).
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borrowers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives. In addition, the para-
metric estimation indicates that both negative occurrence dependence and negative
lagged duration dependence are more pronounced for the consumers who have stronger
consumption smoothing motives, implying that those consumers exert more effort to
prevent default.
I also employ nonparametric approach to identify heterogeneous moral hazard on
various dimensions. First, younger consumers tend to exert more effort to prevent
default, relative to older ones. It is consistent with the intuition that borrowers who
have higher opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit market exert more
effort to prevent default. Younger consumers value the opportunity of access to the
credit market higher at least for two reasons. First, most of them, need to utilize
credit market more in the future than older borrowers: for example, they may plan to
purchase durables such as a car or a house. Also they expect their income path will
grow in the future, which also makes them value the access to the credit market higher.
On top of that, they expect longer period of life to transact with financial institutions.
This pattern and intuition is supplemented by examining two different groups: house
owners and renters. Renters value access to the credit market higher, since they may
want to borrow money from the bank for mortgage loans in the future. So their oppor-
tunity cost of being excluded from the credit market is higher than the house owners.
This result is also generalized by comparing the consumers with low asset of real estate
and consumers with high asset of real estate. Consumers with low asset of real estate
value access to the credit market higher since they have less buffer when the bad income
shock is realized. These facts support the argument that consumers who value access
to the credit market higher do indeed exert more effort to prevent default.
It is well known that separately identifying moral hazard and adverse selection in
the static setting, using cross-sectional data, is difficult. Several papers successfully
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separate them out based on some large-scale randomized experiments or by exploiting
institutional features that move borrowers across contracts without directly affecting
their behavior. Ausubel (1999), Karlan and Zinman (2009) and Agarwal, Chomsisen-
gphet and Liu (2010) use large-scale randomized experiments while Adams, Einav and
Levin (2009), Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012), Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2013b), and
Dobbie and Skiba (2013) exploit regulatory and institutional features to separately
identify moral hazard and adverse selection.
Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) develop nonparametric tests to separately
identify moral hazard from asymmetric information in dynamic settings with panel
data. They exploit dynamic contract features, accident histories, and shocks to dis-
counted marginal cost of future accidents to identify moral hazard in the French car
insurance market. This approach has been extended by Abbring, Chiappori and Zavadil
(2008) and Dionne, Pinquet, Maurice and Vanasse (2010). Similarly, I exploit the dy-
namic contract features of the loan delinquency data and employ both parametric and
nonparametric test to identify moral hazard.
My argument is also reminiscent of that on a health insurance market by Einav,
Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf and Cullen (2013a). In their paper, the cost of effort varies
according to the hidden characteristic of each people. While, in my case, the benefit
of effort varies according to the unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing
motives. More concretely, consumers with stronger consumption smoothing motives
have higher benefit of effort. As a result, they are going to exert more effort. In turn,
they are going to be more responsive to the changes in incentives. And this is what I
call selection on moral hazard.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2.2 provides ideas to
separately identify moral hazard. Chapter 2.3 provides institutional background of the
Korean consumer credit market, which makes the identification possible. Chapter 2.4
67
provides the theoretical foundation showing that, if there is moral hazard, one expects
negative occurrence dependence and/or negative lagged duration dependence under
the experience ratings in the Korean consumer credit market. Chapter 2.5 describes
the dataset. Chapter 2.6 introduces econometric model and empirical results. Finally,
chapter 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Identifying Moral Hazard
In the previous chapter, I provide evidence of advantageous selection in the form of
a negative correlation between a loan interest rate and the hazard of default in the
consumer credit market. Consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives
tend to choose a credit loan, which charges a higher interest rate, and at the same time
they default less, generating the negative correlation between a loan interest rate and
default risk.
This negative correlation is based on the negative association between consump-
tion smoothing motives and default risk: consumers who have stronger consumption
smoothing motives are less likely to default. There are two possible underlying stories
that generate this negative association between consumption smoothing motives and
default risk.
Here I introduce two hypotheses that may generate the negative association between
consumption smoothing motives and default risk.
Hypothesis 1
There is bi-dimensional self-selection: One based on unobserved heterogeneity in
consumption smoothing motives and the other based on unobserved heterogeneity in
default risk, and they happen to be negatively associated.
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Hypothesis 2
There is uni-dimensional adverse selection but there is also moral hazard: there is
unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives and consumers who are
un-observably strongly motivated to smooth consumption exert more costly effort to
avoid default since they are more eager to sustain their opportunity to smooth con-
sumption through the credit market, generating the endogenous negative association
between consumption smoothing motives and default risk.
Either hypothesis, combined with the fact that consumers who are strongly moti-
vated to smooth consumption tend to choose a higher interest rate loan, may generate
the negative correlation between a loan interest rate and default hazard.
However, in this paper, by separately identifying moral hazard from adverse se-
lection, I give empirical evidence in favor of the second hypothesis. I will show that
consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives indeed exert more costly
effort to avoid default. In order to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selec-
tion, I exploit dynamic contract features of this lending contract.
Two Approaches Identifying Moral Hazard
There are at least two broad ways to identify moral hazard from asymmetric information
in dynamic setting with panel data (Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003), Chiappori
and Salanie´ (2013)). One approach is to compare the features of existing contracts to the
theoretical predictions about the form of optimal contracts under adverse selection and
moral hazard. This approach exploits the fact that, in a dynamic setting, optimality
has different implications in each case. Hence, a careful empirical investigation of
the dynamic features of observed contracts may provide useful insights in the type of
problem they are designed to address. This approach is very robust if it relies on simple
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qualitative characteristics of optimal contracts. But except for very specific cases, it is
very hard to derive the dynamic optimal contracts under asymmetric information.
Instead, here I follow the second approach, as in Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet
(2003). This does not assume optimality of the existing contracts. It merely relies on
the idea that particular features of existing contracts, whether optimal or not, have
different theoretical implications for observed behavior under adverse selection and
moral hazard.
Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) point out that particular features of existing
contracts, whether optimal or not, have different theoretical implications for observed
behavior under adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore, adverse selection and
moral hazard can be separately identified by a careful analysis of observed behavior.
More concretely, they show that, under the “bonus-malus” scheme in car insurance
markets, moral hazard leads to negative occurrence dependence: the occurrence of
an accident increases incentives to prevent an accident in the future and reduces the
probability of the future accident. On the other hand, under pure adverse selection,
accident probabilities should not respond to the history of accidents.
Regarding the credit market, here I deal with the history of delinquencies, which
are the previous steps of the default, and dynamic contract features, especially penalty
schemes, related to the history of delinquency. Note that, unlike car accident in which
duration of the accident does not make sense, duration of past delinquencies, i.e. time
spent in past delinquency states, in addition to the number of past delinquencies, is
also included in the history of delinquency.
In Korean credit market, the cost of future delinquency increases in a convex way
as both the number and duration of past delinquencies increase. Under such a con-
vex penalty scheme, an occurrence and/or longer duration of delinquency increases the
marginal cost of future delinquency, which in turn changes the incentives to prevent fu-
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ture delinquency. As a result, if I find negative occurrence dependence and/or negative
lagged duration dependence, it indicates that the Hypothesis 2 is true.5
The most important part to exactly figure out negative occurrence dependence and
negative lagged duration dependence is to disentangle the unobserved heterogeneity in
risk type. If someone simply examines the inter-temporal correlation of delinquency,
it is likely to find the positive occurrence and/or positive lagged duration dependence
caused by the unobserved heterogeneity in delinquency risk: bad type consumers made
more and longer delinquencies in the past and are also more likely to be delinquent in
the future, indicating that both negative occurrence and lagged duration dependence
are revealed only if successfully conditioning on borrowers’ observed and unobserved
heterogeneity.
I show that there is indeed negative occurrence and negative lagged duration de-
pendence and it is more conspicuous among consumers who are strongly motivated to
smooth consumption. Those consumers are more careful to avoid default so they do
not lose their opportunity to smooth consumption through the credit market.
Occurrence Dependence and Lagged Duration Dependece
At an individual level, that is to say conditional on all observables and unobservables,
occurrence dependence means that the number of previous delinquent spells affects
the probability that a consumer will become or remain delinquent. Similarly, lagged
duration dependence means that the probabilities of remaining delinquent or becoming
delinquent depend on the lengths of previous delinquent spells.
Note that both of them are causal relations: occurrence and/or longer duration
of past delinquencies changes the incentives of a borrower, resulting in change in the
probability of remaining or becoming delinquent.
5Mathematical definitions of negative occurrence dependence and negative lagged duration depen-
dence will be introduced soon.
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Let me set Dt to be a dummy variable which shows the status of delinquency in
period t. If delinquency occurs at period t, then Dt = 1, otherwise Dt = 0.
The mathematical definition of occurrence dependence follows, for each individual
i, and ∀j = 0, 1, 2, ...,
Pi(Dt+j = 1|Dt−1 = 1)

> Pi(Dt+j = 1|Dt−1 = 0) : Positive Occurrence Dependence
= Pi(Dt+j = 1|Dt−1 = 0) : No Occurrence Dependence
< Pi(Dt+j = 1|Dt−1 = 0) : Negative Occurrence Dependence
In Appendix B, I show that the experience rating scheme used in the Korean con-
sumer credit market causes the negative occurrence dependence and the negative lagged
duration dependence by a dynamic optimizing model, which signals the existence of
moral hazard. Please see Appendix B. to find the theoretical background of the neg-
ative occurrence dependence and negative lagged duration dependence under convex
penalty scheme.
2.3 Institutional Background
Here I introduce dynamic contract features in the Korean credit market. Specifically, I
focus on the experience ratings on delinquencies in the Korean credit market.
I use the common definition of short term delinquency and long term delinquency.
Short term delinquency is defined as being delinquent less than 90 days, while long term
delinquency is defined as being delinquent more than 90 days. Long term delinquency
is regarded as a default without any special reasons. In this part, I focus on short
term delinquency and its negative occurrence and lagged duration dependence in the
consumer credit market.
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Experience Rating in the Korean Credit Market
In Korea, when a borrower is delinquent more than 5 business days on a payment
of more than about $100, banks report the delinquency to the credit bureau. This
information is propagated to all financial institutions in Korea. On top of that, once
delinquency is reported to the credit bureau, all payment by credit cards is denied and
also the borrower cannot make any additional loans until she repays the delinquent
amount.
The exact formula to evaluate the credit score is strictly confidential. Instead, here
I list several qualitative features of credit scoring provided by the credit bureau.
1. When delinquency occurs the credit score decreases. How much it decreases
depends on the personal characteristics and past history of delinquency. If the
borrower was in good standing (high credit score) the amount of decrease is small
while the amount of decrease is large if he was in bad standing.
2. If the consumer repays the delinquent amount quickly, only for the first time
delinquency, credit score can be recovered to almost same as the original level.
How much the credit score is recovered depends on the length of delinquency and
amount of delinquency.
3. If the consumer makes the second delinquency in the future, her credit score
decreases larger than the first time delinquency even the length of delinquency
and the delinquent amount is the same, since there is additional penalty called
“cumulative delinquency penalty”. As a result, the penalty scheme for credit
score is convex.
4. Cumulative delinquency penalty is also applied to the duration of delinquency.
For any fixed number of delinquency, if the duration of delinquency increases,
then the penalty increases, which means the cost of future delinquency increases.
5. If the cumulative number of days being delinquent reaches 90 days (even if it is
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reached by several times of separate delinquency), the penalty is huge. It is hard
to get any kind of credit (including credit cards) from any financial institution.
A lower credit score affects all kinds of financial contracts. When a consumer borrows
money, not only the limit of the loan decreases but also the interest rate increases
highly. Furthermore, if a borrower makes several delinquencies, any kind of loan is
denied and at the same time, the payment by credit cards is also denied. So she loses
ways to smooth consumption.
On top of that, the bank penalizes the borrower by applying an additional penalty
interest rate when delinquency occurs. For the short term delinquency, especially less
than a month, the bank applies an additional 6% annual interest rate to the delinquent
amount. If the borrower has been delinquent more than a month, “acceleration” starts,
which means, from that point, the increased annual interest rate is applied not to
delinquent amount but to the outstanding debts itself. As a result, monthly due amount
increases in a very convex way. If the borrower is delinquent for 3 consecutive months
(90 days), an annual interest rate is increased by 7 percentage points and it is applied
to the outstanding debts. Furthermore, the bank regards the loan as being default and
becomes to have a right to sell collateral at auction to withdraw the bad loan.
Here is an example. Suppose a consumer borrows 100 thousand dollars at 6% annual
interest rate. The principal is due at the end of the contract and the borrower only
needs to pay monthly interest. According to the contract, monthly interest is $500.
If the borrower is delinquent for a month, 6% annual interest rate is added to the
original interest rate, leading to 12% annual interest rate to the delinquent amount.
So, in the next month she needs to pay $1005(= $505 + $500) to the bank. If the
borrower, however, is delinquent for two months, “acceleration” starts: Not to the
delinquent amount but to the outstanding debts, 12% interest rate is applied in the
second month. So, she needs to pay $2005 = [$505(1st month) + $500(2nd month) +
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$1000(“by acceleration”)]. If the borrower is delinquent again, the bank regards the
loan as being default.
Why Delinquency Occurs: ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard
A consumer exerts costly effort to prepare sufficient liquidity to pay her monthly due
amount. And then, once the monthly income is realized, the consumer optimally
chooses whether to be delinquent or not. If the realized income does not meet the
monthly due amount, of course, she will be delinquent. However, even when the con-
sumer can repay the debt, she still may optimally choose not to repay.
If the level of effort to stay liquid is affected by the contract terms, we speak of
ex-ante moral hazard. On the other hand, after monthly income is realized, if the
optimal decision to being delinquent or not is affected by the contract terms, we speak
of ex-post moral hazard.
In the theoretical model, I consider both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard (Please
refer to the full model in Appendix B.). The model shows that, under convex penalty
scheme, a consumer exerts more effort to prepare liquidity and decreases the threshold
income level whether to being delinquent or not.
In the empirical model, however, it is difficult to separate ex-ante moral hazard
from ex-post moral hazard in the credit market. In the automobile insurance market,
Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) discard all accidents in which only one automobile was
involved in order to exclude ex-post moral hazard. Whenever, at least, two automobiles
are involved, it is hard to optimally choose not to declare. When it comes to the credit
market, as far as I know, there is no previous work to separate ex-ante moral hazard
from ex-post moral hazard. This will be left for the future work.
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2.4 Theoretical Foundation
Here I consider a dynamic version of a credit market model that a consumer chooses
the optimal level of effort to prevent delinquency and then optimally chooses whether
to be delinquent or not every period. Basically, I try to show that if there is moral
hazard, i.e. if a consumer can change the probability of delinquency by exerting costly
effort, then there would be negative occurrence dependence under the convex penalty
scheme on delinquencies.
Consider a consumer with the instantaneous utility u(vt, ct) that is strictly concave,
increasing, and twice continuously differentiable in the 2nd argument. Utility comes
from two arguments, the value of durables, vt, which can also be used as collateral (like
house or car) and non-durable consumption, ct.
Suppose the income follows a process yt = y0 + et + ηt, where y0 is determined
from personal own characteristics, et is costly effort, and ηt is stochastic part that is
identically and independently distributed across time with Eηt = 0. And suppose the
cost of effort Γ(et) is strictly convex, increasing, and twice continuously differentiable.
At every period, the consumer chooses a optimal level of effort e∗t which depends on
dt−1, the full history of delinquency until time period t− 1. And after ηt is drawn from
the distribution, i.e. the monthly income yt realizes, the consumer chooses whether to
be delinquent or not.







And after the monthly income realizes the consumer optimally chooses whether to
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t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))}
(2.2)
Here I simply provide the results but the full model will be provided in Appendix C.
Proposition 1.
There exists a threshold income y∗t , such that a consumer optimizes to be delinquent
if yt < y
∗
t , otherwise repays the monthly due amount. Furthermore,
y∗t (βEt[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
−Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))])
is decreasing in the argument.
Proposition 1. implies that the optimal income threshold y∗t (d
t−1) is decreasing in
the number of past delinquencies and/or duration of past delinquencies under the con-
vex penalty scheme.
Proposition 2.
The optimal effort level, e∗t (d
t−1), increases as the past number of delinquencies
and/or the past duration of delinquencies increases when mt is relatively small.
In sum, as the number and/or duration of past delinquencies increases, y∗t decreases
by Proposition 1, and e∗t increases by Proposition 2.
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As a result,
max{y∗t ,mt} − e∗t
decreases as the number and/or duration of past delinquent spells increases.
Therefore, the theoretical model predicts that there are negative occurrence depen-
dence and negative lagged duration dependence under the convex penalty scheme on
delinquencies in the Korean credit market.
2.5 The Data
Here I use the individual level panel data of delinquencies in the Korean consumer
credit market. I observe the full history of delinquencies for each consumer including
the number and duration of each delinquent spells.
The length of the loan contract varies but here I focus on two-year length contract
to fully observe the contract period: I discard right-censored data. Also there is no
consumer who repays the debt and terminates contract earlier than the loan maturity.
So, each observation provides full information on full history, N [0, T ], for the contract
years from a point in time of making each contracts. Here N [0, T ] represents full history
of delinquencies: when delinquencies occurred and how long they continued for each
delinquent spells.
N [0, T ] := {N(t); 0 ≤ t T}
where, N(t) := ]{k : Tk ≤ t}.
Each history of delinquencies in the sample can alternatively be characterized as
the number of claims N(T ) and the duration of each delinquent spells D(T ) with, if
N(T ) > 0, a vector (T1, ..., TN(T )) of delinquent periods. Here, Tk be the time of the
k-th delinquency in the contract period.
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Please refer to Table 2.1 for number of observations by number of delinquencies.
Also for more details of the dataset, please refer to the Section 1.3 of Chapter 1.
2.6 Econometric Model
Here I implement two different approaches. I first identify occurrence dependence non-
parametrically following Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003). Then, I also identify
both occurrence dependence and duration dependence parametrically by adopting Do-
iron and Gørgens (2008).
The previous theoretical model predicts that if I find negative occurrence depen-
dence and/or negative lagged duration dependence under the convex penalty scheme,
it signals the existence of moral hazard in this market. However, to identify negative
occurrence dependence and/or negative lagged duration dependence, it is important to
condition not only on observable characteristics but also on unobservables characteris-
tics that cause dynamic selection confounding factors. If one fails to distinguish pure
heterogeneity and state dependence, then it is more likely to find positive occurrence
dependence and/or positive lagged duration dependence.6
For example, borrowers with a history of many delinquencies reveal their bad risk
types for unobserved reasons. In turn, these borrowers with bad risk types also are more
likely to be delinquent in the future, which generate positive occurrence dependence
instead of one. In sum, it is important for identification to separate pure heterogeneity
with state dependence, which can be attained by exploiting dynamic panel data on
delinquencies.
6Distinguishing heterogeneity and state dependence is originally a critical issue in identifying a
relation of unemployment and labor-supply. Individuals who are in a unemployed state are more
likely to be unemployed in the future. There may be an unobserved heterogeneity which both causes
unemployment now and in the future. On the other hand, present unemployment status may directly
affects the probability of future unemployment. The former one is the effect of dynamic selection,
while the latter one is the state dependence. Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) pointed out this
intuition.
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Again, moral hazard is separately identified by exploiting dynamic panel data on
delinquencies under the convex penalty scheme. This dynamic panel data allows me to
condition on the confounding factor of dynamic selection on unobservable characteris-
tics.
Non-parametrically Test Occurrence Dependence
For the intensity of delinquencies, I consider a form that is similar to mixed proportional
hazard model. Note that this is not a standard form of a mixed proportional hazard
model since it does not have proportional observed part, which is included in individual
specific effect λ, and since it includes a term capturing occurrence dependence.
θ(t|λ,N [0, t)) = λβ(λ)N(t−)ψ(t)
where β(λ) : [0,∞) → (0,∞) represents a measurable function captures occur-
rence dependence, where ψ(t) captures contract-time effects, and where N [0, t) :=
N(u); 0 ≤ u < t represents the full history of delinquencies. Note that N(t) represents
the number of occurrences until time t. The model is quite general except assuming
separability.7
If β(λ) = 1, i.e. the intensity of delinquencies does not depend on the number
of past delinquent spells, then it indicates there is no occurrence dependence. While,
β(λ) < 1 implies there is negative occurrence dependence and β(λ) > 1 implies positive
occurrence dependence.
Now, intuition behind the non-parametric identification under the convex penalty
scheme is as follows. Here, again, the convex penalty scheme indicates a mechanism of
which the marginal cost of future delinquencies increase as the number or duration of
the past delinquent spells increases.
7This model assumes that unobserved characteristics that affect being delinquent do not varies
overtime. If this does not hold, it is impossible to separately identify unobserved heterogeneity from
state dependence.
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For an easy explanation, first I put a restrictive assumption that the contract-time
effects is constant, ψ(t) = c ∈ R+: for example, there is no time-variant effect on
delinquency hazard. Now let me consider the distribution, H1, of the time until the
first delinquency, T1, in the subpopulation who is delinquent once and only once over
the contract period.
H1(t) = Pr(T1 ≤ t|N(T ) = 1)
Under the constant contract-time effects and if there is no moral hazard, β(λ) = 1,
then the intensity of delinquencies is constant overtime: θ(t|λ,N [0, t)) = c0 ∈ R+. As a
result, under the constant contract-time effects, H1(t)
8 should be uniformly distributed
if there is no moral hazard.
However, if there is moral hazard, a consumer responds to the change in incentives.
So a delinquency is more likely to occur sooner than later. As a result, if the cumulative
distribution function of T1, is larger in every point than that of the uniform cumulative
distribution function, then we can conclude that there is moral hazard. However, note
that, under the assumption of no contract-time effect, null hypothesis is that there is
no moral hazard and stationarity.
Then, I will relax the restrictive stationarity assumption, the distribution of the first
claim time, T1, does not have to be uniformly distributed anymore: ψ(t) 6= c ∈ R+.
Instead, let me consider the distribution, H2, of the second claim time, T2, in the
subpopulation with exactly two delinquencies over the contract period.
H2(t) = Pr(T2 ≤ t|N(T ) = 2)






I(T1,i ≤ t,Ni(T ) = 1)
where, Mn,k =
∑n
i=1 I(Ni(T ) = k).
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Then, one expects that
H1(t)
2 = H2(t)
under the null of no moral hazard.




under the convex penalty scheme.
Here I use data of consumer loans with 24 months maturity, which are observed
without censoring. Table 2.1 shows the number of observations by the number of
delinquencies.
Let me define Ψ(t) =
∫ t
0
ψ(u)du. Under stationarity assumption as the previous
intuition suggests, Ψ(t) = t/T , one can show that
H1(t) ≡ Pr(T1 ≤ t|N(T ) = 1) = Ψ(t)
under the Null, β(λ) = 1.
Also, Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) prove that
Pr(T1 ≤ t|N(T ) = 1) ≶ Ψ(t)
if β(λ) ≷ 1.
Figure 2.1 shows the result. In Figure 2.1, the blue line shows the cdf of uniform
distribution and the red line shows the empirical cdf of H1(t) = Pr(T1 ≤ t|N(T ) = 1).
Under stationarity assumption, the null hypothesis of the test is joint hypothesis of
stationarity and no moral hazard.
The result of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that supt∈[0,T ] |Ĥ1(t)− t/T | = 0.107,
p-value = 0.121, implying that there is insignificant positive occurrence dependence or
there is non-stationarity. As I will show later, this comes from non-stationarity rather
than positive occurrence dependence.
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Stationarity assumption is quite strong, so Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003)
also introduce test procedure under general non-stationarity:9 Ψ(t) 6= t/T in general.
Under the null, β(λ) = 1, one can show that
H2(t) ≡ Pr(T2 ≤ t|N(T ) = 2) = Ψ(t)2
It implies that
[Pr(T1 ≤ t|N(T ) = 1)]2 = Pr(T2 ≤ t|N(T ) = 2)
since H1(t) ≡ Pr(T1 ≤ t|N(T ) = 1) = Ψ(t) under the null.
Also as proven in Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003)
[Pr(T1 ≤ t|N(T ) = 1)]2 ≶ Pr(T2 ≤ t|N(T ) = 2)
is the evidence of β ≶ 1. Again, to test it, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic can
be applied.
In Figure 2.2, the red line is the distribution, H2(t) = Pr(T2 ≤ t|N(T ) = 2), of the
second claim time, T2, in the subpopulation with exactly two delinquencies over the
contract period, while the blue line represents [H1(t)]
2 = [Pr(T1 ≤ t|N(T ) = 1)]2. KS
test result shows that supt∈[0,T ][Ĥ2(t) − Ĥ1(t)
2
] = 0.11, p-value < 0.05, which means
that there is negative occurrence dependence once I allow non-stationarity.
For both subgroups of consumers who have strong consumption smoothing motives
or consumers who are relatively weakly motivated to smooth consumption (Figure 2.3
and Figure 2.4), KS test results show that there is negative occurrence dependence and
the negative occurrence dependence is more conspicuous in the subgroup of consumers
who are strongly motivated to smooth consumption. Corresponding KS test results are
as follows.
9For robustness check, more direct comparison of the first and second claim times of each contract
with two claims are executed. And the results show that the negative occurrence dependence is very
robust.
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with corresponding p-value < 0.1.






with corresponding p-value < 0.001.
It means that the negative occurrence dependence is more conspicuous among con-
sumers who are strongly motivated to smooth consumption. The test result corresponds
to the previous argument that consumers who are strongly motivated to smooth con-
sumption have stronger incentive to prevent default since their opportunity cost of
being excluded from the market is higher.
Heterogeneous Moral Hazard on Various Dimensions
From now on, I employ nonparametric identification of moral hazard to show heteroge-
neous moral hazard on various dimensions. First, I apply the test for several different
age groups of borrowers. Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, and Figure 2.7 show the results. Figure
2.5 shows strong negative occurrence dependence, indicating that consumers with age
in between 30 and 45 exert more effort to prevent future delinquency. Figure 2.6 also
shows negative occurrence dependence, indicating that consumers with age in between
45 and 60 exert effort to prevent future delinquency but less careful than the younger
group. On the other hand, Figure 2.7 shows no occurrence dependence, meaning that
the oldest group (older than 60) pay less attention to prevent future delinquency. Here
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0.266 : p-value < 0.001 (30 ≤ Age < 45)
0.156 : p-value < 0.01 (45 ≤ Age < 60)
0.03 : p-value > 0.1 (60 ≤ Age)
It is consistent with the intuition that borrowers exert effort to prevent default
since they have differential opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit market.
Younger consumers value the opportunity of access to the credit market higher for two
reasons. First, most of them, they need to utilize credit market more in the future than
older borrowers, since they plan to purchase a car, a house, such as durables. Also
they expect their income path will grow in the future, which also makes them value the
access to the credit market higher. On top of that, they expect longer period of life to
transact with financial institutions.
This pattern and intuition is supplemented by examining two different groups: house
owners and renters. Renters value access to the credit market higher, since they may
want to borrow money from the bank for mortgage loans in the future. So their oppor-
tunity cost of being excluded from the credit market is higher than the house owners.
From Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9, you can compare these results. Figure 2.8 shows strong
negative occurrence dependence, indicating that renters exert more effort to prevent fu-
ture delinquencies since their opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit market
is higher relative to house owners (Figure 2.9). Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for each







0.216 : p-value < 0.01 (Renters)
0.027 : p-value > 0.1 (House Owners)
This result is also generalized by comparing the consumers with low asset of real
estate and consumers with high asset of real estate (Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11).
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Consumers with low asset of real estate value access to the credit market higher since
they have less buffer when the bad income shock is realized. As a result, they exert
more effort to prevent future delinquencies compared to the consumers with high asset
of real estate. That is why Figure 2.10 shows strong negative occurrence dependence,
while Figure 2.11 shows no occurrence dependence. Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for







0.317 : p-value < 0.001 (Low Asset of Real Estate)
0.036 : p-value > 0.1 (High Asset of Real Estate)
From the similar intuition, consumers with low savings exert more effort to prevent
future delinquencies since they have less buffer when the bad income shock is realized
(Figure 2.12). On the other hand, consumers with high savings exert less effort to pre-
vent future delinquencies since they, somehow, are able to smooth consumption without
accessing to the credit market (Figure 2.13). As a result, Figure 2.12 shows stronger
negative occurrence dependence than Figure 2.13. Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for







0.192 : p-value < 0.01 (Low Savings)
0.089 : p-value < 0.1 (High Savings)
Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15 compares two different groups of income level, showing
that consumers with relatively low income exert more effort to prevent future delin-
quencies. This result is also consistent with the previous intuition.
Finally, Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.17 compare the degree of moral hazard between
women and men. The result shows that women exert more effort to prevent future delin-
quencies while men shows no occurrence dependence. Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics
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0.189 : p-value < 0.01 (Women)
0.049 : p-value > 0.1 (Men)
Actually these days in the Korean consumer credit market, some financial institution
exploits this fact and introduce a loan contract only for women who are less risky and
are profitable for the institution.
In sum, consumers who value access to the credit market higher, i.e. who have higher
opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit market, do indeed exert more effort
to prevent default.
Parametrically Test Occurrence Dependence and Lagged
Duration Dependence
In the Korean consumer credit market, unlike the insurance market described in Ab-
bring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003), not only the number of past delinquencies but
also the duration of past delinquencies matters. As the duration of past delinquen-
cies becomes longer, the convex penalty scheme increases the marginal cost of future
delinquency, resulting in lower probability of future delinquency under moral hazard.
Here, referring to Doiron and Gørgens (2008), I try to estimate both occurrence
dependence and lagged duration dependence to find the evidence of moral hazard in
this market. Again, lagged duration dependence is defined as having longer duration
of previous delinquent spells reduces the probability that a borrower will become or
remains delinquent.
A borrower can be in 3 states (S): Good (G), Delinquency (D), and Default (F).
Yi(t, s) = {Ti,j, Si,j}Ji(t)j=0 represents the delinquency history of person i until period t.
Here, j is the transition times and Ji(t) is the maximal number of transitions until
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period t. Also Ti,j indicates subsequent transition times and Si,j denotes destination
states of individual i at period t. Note that Ti,j−1 < Ti,j and Si,j−1 6= Si,j.
The Likelihood Function
Let h(t, s|y(t¯, s¯), x(t), v) denotes the conditional transition intensity to state s at time
t given that the current spell in state s¯ began at time t¯, where x(t) represents the
observed characteristics and v captures unobserved heterogeneity.
Now, based on this conditional transition intensity, let me introduce the likelihood
function of each consumer conditional on the observable characteristics, xi(ci), and the
unobserved heterogeneity, vi.
The likelihood function becomes,
L(yi(ti,ni , si,ni), ci|xi(ci), vi) = L(ci|yi(ti,ni , si,ni), xi(ci), vi)
× (Πnij=1L(ti,j, si,j|yi(ti,j−1, si,j−1), xi(ti.j), vi))
× L(si,0|ti,0, xi(ti,0), vi)L(ti,0|xi(ti,0), vi)
Here, for si,j−1 6= F
L(ti,j, si,j|yi(ti,j−1, si,j−1), xi(ti,j), vi)






h(u, k|yi(ti,j−1, si,j−1), xi(u), vi)du]
Note that this is an familiar expression of (hazard function × survivor function).
And






h(u, k|yi(ti,ni , si,ni), xi(u), vi)du]




L(yi(ti,ni , si,ni), ci|xi(ci), vi)dF (vi)
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Here, F (vi) denotes the distribution function of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Parameterization and Estimation
The hazard function I use,
h(t, s|y(t¯, s¯), x(t), v) = λs¯,s(t− t¯;αs¯,s) exp(x(t)′βs¯,s + y(t¯)′δs¯,s + z(v)′vs¯,s)
where, λs¯,s(t− t¯;αs¯,s) = αs¯,s(t− t¯)αs¯,s−1.
δs¯,s are the main parameters, which capture negative occurrence dependence and
negative lagged duration dependence.
In order to capture the decrease in the penalty for a new delinquency if the latest
delinquency occurred a long time ago, I use the following specification.
• Cumulative number : ∑Ji(t)j=1 1(Si,j−1 = s)e−ρs(t−Ti,j)
• Cumulative duration : ∑Ji(t)j=1 1(Si,j−1 = s) ∫ Ti,jTi,j−1 e−ρs(t−Ti,j)
The parameter ρs acts as a “discount” or “depreciation” factor that reduces the impact
of a past delinquency as time goes by.
Table 2.2 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of δs¯,s when the state changes
from good “G” to delinquency “D” separately for the consumers who belong to the
consumption smoothing group and who do not belong to the group. Especially, the
first column shows the result of the negative occurrence dependence and the second
column provides evidence of negative lagged duration dependence.
The results show that not only negative occurrence dependence exists but also neg-
ative lagged duration dependence exists. Both negative occurrence dependence and
negative lagged duration dependence are stronger for the consumers who have strong
consumption smoothing motives. For those consumers, future delinquency hazard de-
creases by about 11% (exp(−0.118)−1 = −0.111) as the consumer had been delinquent
one more time, while it decreases by about 7.4% if the consumer had been delinquent 1
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more week. On the other hand, for the consumers who do not belong to the consump-
tion smoothing group, future delinquency hazard does not change as the consumer had
been delinquent one more time, while there is significant negative lagged duration de-
pendence: future delinquency hazard decreases by about 2% if the consumer had been
delinquent 1 more week.
These results show that consumers who have strong consumption smoothing motives
exert more costly effort to avoid default, generating endogenous negative correlation
between consumption smoothing motives and default risk. As such, they again show
the Hypothesis 2 is better explanation of the data than Hypothesis 1.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Previous literatures that address the source and mechanism of advantageous selection
successfully show that empirical relationships between an additional dimension of un-
observed heterogeneity, choices of contract type, and risks in their context lead to
advantageous selection in their markets. However, they does not provide the economic
reasons for the association between an additional dimension of unobserved heterogene-
ity and risks.
By separately identifying moral hazard from adverse selection, in this paper, I reveal
the endogenous relationship between the additional dimension of unobserved hetero-
geneity in consumption smoothing motives and default risk.
Consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives have higher oppor-
tunity cost of being excluded from the credit market. Since default leads to exclusion
from the credit market, consumers with stronger consumption smoothing motives will
exert more effort to prevent default, which generate the endogenous association between
consumption smoothing motives and default risks.
Panel data on delinquencies combined with the convex penalty scheme on delin-
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quencies in the Korean consumer credit market allows me to separately identify moral
hazard from adverse selection. Every increase in either the number or the duration of
past delinquent spells contributes to an even higher marginal cost of a future delin-
quency. This provides additional incentive for a delinquent borrower to prevent future
delinquencies. If I find evidence that borrowers react to these changes in incentives, it
indicates the existence of moral hazard.
In turn, econometrically, negative occurrence dependence and negative lagged du-
ration dependence in the data indicates the existence of moral hazard. Since, under the
convex penalty scheme, the marginal cost of future delinquency increases with the num-
ber and/or duration of past delinquent spells, the behaviors of a rational borrower would
exhibit negative occurrence dependence and negative lagged duration dependence.
I first employ the nonparametric tests developed by Abbring, Chiappori and Pin-
quet (2003) to identify negative occurrence dependence. Then, I employ the parametric
approach by Doiron and Gørgens (2008) to identify both negative occurrence depen-
dence and negative lagged duration dependence. The results of nonparametric tests
show that there is negative occurrence dependence and it is more pronounced among
borrowers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives.
Furthermore, by examining various dimensions of heterogeneity, including age, whether
they rent or own the house, amount of savings, wage, etc., I non-parametrically reveal
that consumers who value access to the credit market higher, i.e. who have higher
opportunity cost of being excluded from the credit market, do indeed exert more effort
to prevent default.
The parametric test fortifies the robustness of the previous results. For the group of
consumers with stronger consumption smoothing motives, not only negative occurrence
dependence but also negative lagged duration dependence is pronounced, indicating
that those consumers do indeed exert more effort to prevent default.
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Finally, since there exists moral hazard, I suggest that policymakers and the bank
should consider legal reforms regarding limited access to effective recourse and should
consider improving dynamic contracting schemes to fully account for the incentives to
prevent default.
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Table 2.1: Number of Observations by the Number of Delinquencies
Number of Delinquencies Observations
M0 (no delinquency) 2902
M1 (1 delinquency) 508
M2 (2 delinquencies) 218
M3 (3 delinquencies) 110
M4 (4 delinquencies) 82
M5 (5 delinquencies) 38

















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2: Allow Nonstationarity (Full Sample)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)





















Figure 2.4: Allow Nonstationarity (Consumption Smoothing Group)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)




















Figure 2.6: Allow Nonstationarity (Age between 45 ∼ 60)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)











Figure 2.7: Allow Nonstationarity (Age over 60)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)






















Figure 2.9: Allow Nonstationarity (House Owners)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)






















Figure 2.11: Allow Nonstationarity (Consumers with High Real Estate Asset)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)






















Figure 2.13: Allow Nonstationarity (High Savings)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)





















Figure 2.15: Allow Nonstationarity (High Income)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)





















Figure 2.17: Allow Nonstationarity (Men)
Note: Blue line: Ĥ1(t)










































































































































































































































































Given its central role in determining agents’ inter-temporal decisions, the estimation
of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES)1 has been the target of a compre-
hensive body of both “micro” and “macro” empirical studies.2 Those studies place the
value of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in a wide interval, ranging from
“insignificant and close to zero” (Hall (1988))3 to a higher IES = 0.8 found by Attana-
sio and Weber (1993), to an even more substantial IES = 1.92 reported by Mulligan
(2002) in of his empirical specifications.
More recently, Gruber (2013) finds a value of 2 for the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution by using arguably exogenous variations in effective interest rates derived
from movements in capital income tax rates. Best, Cloyne, Ilzetzki and Kleven (2015)
exploit “notches” in the interest rate schedule across loan-to-value ratios in the United
Kingdom; the degree of bunching around these notches allows them to back out the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution by means of a structural model.
In this paper, we try to estimate inter-temporal elasticity of substitution using a
dataset including choices of a loan type and related outcome of default. Furthermore,
we not only estimate the distribution of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution but also
1The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption reflects households’ willingness to
substitute consumption between time periods in response to changes in the expected real interest rate.
2Campbell and Viceira (1999) argue that inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is the key pa-
rameter in the optimal consumption rule.
3To estimate the IES, researchers often follow Hall (1988) and use the log-linearized consumption
Euler equation. The usual way to estimate elasticity of inter-temporal elasticity is that researchers
regress consumption growth on the inter-temporal price of consumption, the relate rate of return.
∆ct+1 = αi + IES × ri,t+1 + i,t+1
where, ∆ct+1 denotes consumption growth at time t + 1, ri,t+1 denotes the real return on asset i at
time t+ 1, and i,t+1 denotes the error term. The error term, i,t+1, is correlated with the real return
on asset, ri,t+1, so usually instruments are used to get consistent estimates of IES. Several studies
estimated the above equation using US data, including Mankiw (1981), Hall (1988) and Campbell and
Mankiw (1989). They found estimates of IES that were small (i.e., below 0.25) and barely statistically
significant. As a result, from this point researchers began to examine this issue from different angles.
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estimate the joint distribution of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and default
risks.
In the Korean consumer credit market, consumers may choose a type of loan, i.e.
a collateralized loan or a credit loan, when they borrow money from a bank. After
classifying consumers based on their observable risk factors, a bank suggests a menu of
contracts. Each contract consists of an interest rate paired with a collateral requirement,
where the loan interest rate is decreasing in the value of pledged collateral.4 Different
types of loans generate a potentially different consumption path in the future. If a
borrower chooses a collateralized loan, she loses pledged collateral once she defaults,
potentially resulting in severe changes in her future consumption path.5 Therefore,
those who derive larger disutility from a volatile consumption path will be more willing
to bear large interest costs instead of pledging high levels of collateral. So inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution plays an important role when they choose a type of loan,
especially when the bank, which proposes the menu, has market power.6
Under this market condition, we develop a structural econometric model to estimate
private variation in inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and in default risk. Also we
estimate their correlation structure from the data on choices of a loan type and default
outcome in the Korean consumer credit market. A consumer credit market provides
an obvious environment to estimate the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution since
inter-temporal consumption smoothing is the primary reason for consumers to join the
credit market.7
We consider a rational and forward looking borrower who maximizes lifetime util-
4More details are provided in chapter 1.4.
5A collateralized loan is high powered contract, while a credit loan is relatively low powered
contract.
6Please refer to the “credit market model” in Chapter 1 for the role of market power.
7In Cohen and Einav (2007), they argue that to the extent that extrapolating utility parameters
from one market context to another necessitates additional assumptions, there is an advantage to
obtaining such parameters from the same markets to which they are subsequently applied.
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ity given an exogenous stochastic default rate for the model of loan type choices. If
consumers choose a credit loan, they need to pay a higher loan interest rate instead of
pledging any collateral. On the other hand, if they choose a collateralized loan, they
can pay a lower interest rate but instead need to pledge collateral that is distressed
when they default.
We then introduce bi-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity: one in default risk,
and the other in consumption smoothing motives. Since a collateralized loan is a
higher-powered contract, if the sole dimension of heterogeneity is consumers’ default
risk, then those who are riskier will choose a lowered-powered contract, i.e. a credit
loan, while less risky consumers tend to choose a collateralized loan. On the other
hand, consumers with low inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, i.e. with stronger
consumption smoothing motives, are willing to pay a higher interest rate to reduce the
collateral requirement by one unit. All else equal, they tend to choose a credit loan
that charges a higher interest rate without a collateral requirement.
To identify the joint distribution of default risk and inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution, we assume that the joint distribution is drawn from a bivariate lognormal
distribution. On top of that, we assume that the default process follows a mixed
proportional hazard model, which allows us to identify the default process only from
the marginal distribution of default outcome.
The estimated inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is about 0.61, which is larger
than the estimate of Hall (1988), but is less than the estimate of Attanasio and We-
ber (1993). Also the estimation results show that there is a strong and statistically
significant positive correlation between default risk and the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution.
This positive correlation is consistent with the results in the previous chapters.
The advantageous selection that I documented in chapter 1 is based on the fact that
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consumer who have stronger consumption smoothing motives have higher opportunity
cost of being excluded from the credit market so they exert more effort to prevent
default as I showed in chapter 2. In sum, if default leads to exclusion from the credit
market, there is a positive association between inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
and default risks.8
This work is also related to the recent growing literature that studies asymmetric
information in credit markets using structural models. Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012)
analyze the demand and pricing for subprime loans and Einav, Jenkins and Levin
(2013b) evaluate the effect of introducing automated credit scoring and the changes it
enabled in lending at a large auto finance company. Also more recently, Kawai, Onishi
and Uetake (2014) analyze welfare impact of signaling in the online credit market.
They found that a borrower’s reserve interest rate is used as a signaling device that
reveals the borrower’s creditworthiness. And they explore how signaling affects market
outcomes and welfare in several counterfactual settings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 3.2 describes the
data. Chapter 3.3 discusses assumptions on the model primitives and also those for
identification. Then, I describe the model of choices on a loan type. Chapter 3.4
discusses the identification of the joint distribution. Chapter 3.5 provides estimation
process and the results. Finally, chapter 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Data
We study the Korean consumer credit market that underwent a huge consolidation
initiated by the governmental authority.9 As a result, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
8Here, I assume that the default hazard does not depend on the choice of the loan type. However,
it still can depend on the individual preference, in this case consumption smoothing motives.
9This consolidation had been conducted right after 1997 Asian financial crisis. As a result, the
bank market integrated into small number of large banks. On top of that, variation of the banks size
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(HHI) rose from 835.6 to 2,262.7 between the year 1995 and the year 2002 in the
consumer credit market. This consolidation not only increased market concentration in
the Korean consumer credit market but also increased market power of the bank that
provides a menu of contracts.
The market share of the bank, the provider of our dataset, is about 42.6% in year
2002.10 Through the data period, the bank maintained its market power for consumer
loans except for small fluctuations.11 The highly concentrated consumer loan market,
as we proved in the previous section, provides an environment in which an additional
dimension of heterogeneity may cause non-classical results. Here we introduce several
features of the dataset but, for more details, please refer to the chapter 1 of dissertation.
The data is comprised of individual consumer loans initiated between April 2005
and May 2009. For each loan, the data contains its history from the initiation date
till May 2009. As measures of consumer credit risk, we have credit score, credit class,
behavior score, and introducing score. Credit score and credit class are rated by a
third party agency and are most widely used in the consumer credit market. Behavior
score is similar to the credit score but evaluated by the bank itself rather than by a
third party agency. The bank observes the behavior of the borrower and updates the
behavior score over time. Behavior score is more frequently updated than the credit
score. Introducing score is only available for the first-time borrowers. Since banks do
not have enough credit information for the first-time borrowers, they additionally build
the introducing score. In addition to measuring credit, the introducing score also allows
me to identify who are the first-time borrowers.
The crucial feature we exploit here is that the bank suggests a menu of contracts
has been increased a lot, which generates high concentration in the market.
10In terms of mutual installment deposit market, the market share of this bank comes close to
61.5% in year 2002 and corresponding HHI is 4,040.8.
11Please refer to Figure 1.2 in chapter 1 for the figure showing the full history of bank merging in
Korea.
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composed of pairs of loan interest rates and collateral requirements after classifying
consumers based on their observable risk factors. A borrower can choose whether to
make a credit loan or a collateralized loan. There are several options for collateralized
loans in terms of what will be kept as a pledge, such as real estate, savings, or warranty
from a credit guarantee company.
The bank charges a higher loan interest rate for credit loans than for collateralized
loans. Table 3.1 explicitly shows the negative correlation between a loan interest rate
and value of pledged collateral in my dataset: the interest rate of credit loans is, on av-
erage, 1.88 percentage points higher than that of collateralized loans after conditioning
on observable factors used in pricing the loans.
Here we briefly discuss the source of the negative correlation between a loan interest
rate and value of pledged collateral. The interest rate charged on a loan can be decom-
posed into internal rate, education taxes,12 profit, and credit risk cost.13 Among them,
the credit risk cost is the source of the negative correlation between a loan interest rate
and the value of pledged collateral.
The credit risk cost is the expected cost of default for the bank, which is higher for
consumers with a higher expected default rate and is lower for loans with high recovery.
In turn, it means that a bank charges a higher interest rate to borrowers with lower
credit ratings, while it offers a lower interest rate for collateralized loans than for credit
loans, thereby generating a negative relationship between a loan interest rate and the
value of pledged collateral, given credit ratings.14
12This education tax is constant along the whole data period.
13Loan Interest Rate = Internal Rate + Tax + Credit Risk Cost + Profit. This is a rough formula.
The exact formula for the loan interest rate is kept secret by the banks.
14This negative relationship is a quite general feature. Dey and Dunn (2007) empirically show the
negative correlation between the value of the pledged collateral by borrowers and the interest rate
charged by bank in the HELOC(Home Equity Line of Credit) market. They support the sorting-by-
private-information paradigm (borrowers who pledged higher amounts of collateral signal their superior
risk-types and therefore are rewarded with lower interest rates by the bank) against the sorting-by-
observed-risk paradigm, which predicts a positive correlation between collateral and borrower risk.
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3.3 The Model of Loan Type Choice
We discuss a model of a loan type choice of a consumer who has bi-dimensional pri-
vate information on consumption smoothing motives and default risks that follow a
exogenous process. We then proceed to describe an empirical model and how we model
unobserved heterogeneity both in default risks and consumption smoothing motives
through mixed proportional hazard model and heterogenous inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution separately. And then, we briefly discuss identification of the model,
parametrization, and the estimation procedure. Identification and estimation proce-
dure follow the idea from Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010).
We consider the utility maximizing loan type choice of a rational, forward looking
borrower with stochastic default rate and time-separable utility.15 If consumers choose
a credit loan, they need to pay a higher loan interest rate instead of pledging collateral.
On the other hand, if they choose a collateralized loan, they can pay a lower interest
rate but instead need to pledge collateral that is distressed when they default. So if the
sole dimension of heterogeneity is consumers’ default risk, then those who are riskier
will choose a credit loan even with a higher interest rate, while less risky consumers
tend to choose a collateralized loan, inducing the classical adverse selection story. This
will be generalized soon since we also introduce unobserved heterogeneity in consump-
tion smoothing motives and will recover the joint distribution of those bi-dimensional
unobserved heterogeneity using data on default outcome and choices of a loan type.
When consumers and the bank make loan contracts at period t0, the consumers ex-
pect exogenous probability of default every period. We allow unobserved heterogeneity
in default process by using a mixed proportional hazard model. This mixed propor-
tional hazard assumption on the default process facilitates identification of the marginal
15This framework is adopted from Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and
Brown (1999), Davidoff, Brown and Diamond (2005), Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010).
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distribution of default. Specifically, we assume that the default risk of consumer i at
period t is characterized by θit.
θit = lim
h→+0
Pr(mi ∈ [t, t+ h)|xi,mi ≥ t)
h
= αiθ0(xi)ψ(t)
Here, mi denotes the time at default, and αi ∈ R+ represents unobserved hetero-
geneity in default risk for each individual i. Also ψ(t) denotes the baseline hazard rate
which is common to all borrowers.
Furthermore, we assume that consumers have perfect foresight about their stochas-
tic default process, that is to say, we assume that they know their θit. Under these
assumptions we can construct κit that represents discrete hazard rate.
This discrete hazard rate of default is private information which is characterized by











Now we will introduce the additional dimension of private information on consump-
tion smoothing motives. This additional dimension matters in this market since the
bank has market power. If the market is perfectly competitive, any other unobserved
heterogeneity except default risk is irrelevant in the sense that it does not affect profit
of the bank. So the bank does not consider when they set the optimal contract. On
the other hand, if the bank has market power, it can increase it’s profit by exploiting
heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives when they set a menu of contracts.16
Again, in this paper, inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is used as a shortcut to




= − d log(ct+1/ct)
d log u′(ct+1)/u′(ct)
16Jullien, Salanie´ and Salanie´ (2007) characterize the optimal menu of contracts when the agent’s
risk-aversion is his private information.
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Consumers have heterogenous inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, γi, that also
affects choice of loan types in the credit market and might also is correlated to the un-
observed heterogeneity in default risks. Consumers with low inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution are willing to pay a higher interest rate to reduce the collateral require-
ment by one unit. So if every other conditions are equal, then they tend to choose a
credit loan that charges a higher interest rate instead of requiring any collateral to be
pledged.
Model of Loan Type Choice
Now, consider a dynamic model of borrowers’ choices on a loan type. The period utility







where, η is the relative importance of non-durable consumption to the durable consump-
tion, and where γ is the source of unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing
motives of each consumer. Utility comes from two arguments, the value of durables, d,
which can also be used as collateral (like house or car) and non-durable consumption,
c.
Consumers optimize their lifetime utility by choosing consumption stream, and
by choosing type of the loan based on their private information on default risks and
consumption smoothing motives.
If a consumer does not default, she can borrow and save freely in the future. How-
ever, once she defaults she will fall into autarky economy.
The main value function is as follows.






at(α)u(ct, d0) + ft(α)V
Au(bt, wt, d0(1− νζ))
}
+ βT+1aT (α)V
gf (bT+1, wT+1, d0) (3.1)
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subject to wealth evolution,
bt+1 = Rbt + wt − ct − Fν
where R is the per period growth savings interest rate, and where Fν is the monthly
repayment amount which depends on the type of the loan ν. If ν = 0, then it indicates
the loan is a credit loan, while if ν = 1, then it means the loan is collateralized. Since
credit loans charge a higher interest rate than collateralized loans for the same amount
of loan, the monthly due amount, Fν , is higher for credit loans than for collateralized
loans.
For the wage process we assume,
wt = δ
tw0 + (1− δt)w¯
where, the parameters w0 and w¯ respectively represent the “initial” and the “long term”
wage.








Here, V Au(bt, wt, d0(1− νζ)) represents the value function in autarky economy, and
V gf (bT+1, wT+1, d0) represents the value function when the consumers complete the loan
term without any default.






Then, the initial consumption17 will satisfy








Consumption is “debt service in period 0” plus a convex combination of the initial
wage and the long term wage since 0 < δ < 1.




βt{at(α)u(ct, d0) + ft(α)V Au(bt, wt, d0(1− νζ))
+ ψt(bt+1 −Rbt + ct − Fν + wt)}+ βT+1aT (α)V gf (bT+1, wT+1, d0)
We get
1. From consumption FOC,
at(α)uc(ct, d0) = −ψt
2. Next period assets bt+1 FOC at periods 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 implies
ψt+1 = ψt + βft+1(α)∂bV
Au(bt+1, wt+1, d0(1− νζ))
3. Assets at bT+1 FOC:
βaT (α)∂bV
gf (bT+1, wT+1, d0) = −ψT
where,





































Intuitively, everything else equal, more risky consumers tend to choose credit loans,
which is a low-powered contract. While, everything else equal, consumers with lower
17Here we assume βR = 1.
116
elasticity of inter-temporal consumptions would choose credit loans since they are will-
ing to pay a higher interest rate to reduce collateral requirements by one unit. In-
formation about the consumers’ choice of loan types paired with the assumption that
this choice is made optimally provides information about the consumers’ underlying
preference and expected default parameters.
3.4 Identification
To identify the above model, we make several assumptions. Here we allow two dimen-
sions of unobserved heterogeneity: one in default risk, and the other in consumption
smoothing motives. The unobserved heterogeneity in default risk is represented by in-
dividual unobserved heterogeneity component in the mixed proportional hazard model,
while the unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives is captured by
heterogeneous inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. Under these modeling of het-
erogeneity, here we summarize our identification assumptions.
Identification Assumptions
In this model, we make several assumptions for the identification. This identification
strategy follows Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010). These assumptions allow us to
recover the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in default risks and consump-
tion smoothing motives that is represented by inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
Here we list and summarize the identification assumptions.
Assumption 1: Default outcome follows a mixed proportional hazard model
θit = αiθ0(xi)ψ(t).
Assumption 2: Default hazard rate does not depend on the choice of loan type
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once it is conditioned on αi.











The first assumption is crucial in that allowing us to recover the marginal distri-
bution of default rate only from the default outcome. Here follows the well known
proposition by Elbers and Ridder (1982), Heckman and Singer (1984), Ridder (1990),
and Van den Berg (2001).
Proposition 1.
If E[α] <∞, θ0(xi) is not a constant, and if assumptions 1 holds, then the marginal
distribution of αi, θ0(xi), and ψ(t) are identified up to the normalizations E[α] = 1 and
θ0(xi) = 1 for some i from the conditional distribution of Fm(mi|xi).
This proposition is directly resulted from the assumption that default outcome fol-
lows mixed proportional hazard model. It says that if we assume that default outcome
follows the mixed proportional hazard model, it is identified non-parametrically up to
the normalization.
Proposition 2. (Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010))
If assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold, then the joint distribution of default outcome and loan
type choice identifies Pr(ν(α, γ) ≤ y|α). Moreover, if for every value of α, ν(α, γ) is
invertible with respect to γ, then Fγ|α is identified.
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Parametrization
Since a choice of loan type is discrete, ν(γ|α) is only weakly monotone in γ. That
is to say, for any fixed level of private default risk, α, as γ increases, the optimal
ν(γ|α) changes from 0 to 1. For the identification, we need invertibility of ν(γ|α)
(Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010)). So to attain identification, some parametric
assumptions are needed to recover the entire distribution of γ, conditional on α. So here
we assume that default hazard rate follows mixed proportional hazard function with
exponential distribution on ψ(t). As a result, the survival function becomes S(α, λ) =
exp[−αλt] based on the parametrization.
Furthermore, we assume that the joint distribution of αi and γi is a bivariate log-
normal distribution. This parametrization assumptions allow us to identify the joint














where, σαγ = ρσασγ with correlation coefficient ρ.
3.5 Estimation and the Results
For each individual, we observe default outcome mi = (ti, di). ti is the duration of a
consumer i. The definition of duration, ti, is as follows. If a consumer defaults at some
point, then the duration is the time until defaults. On the other hand, if a consumer
completes the contract term without default or if the spell is censored, then duration
is the time until the last observation period. Here, di indicates whether a consumer
defaults (di = 1) or was censored (di = 0).
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Here we estimate the parameters in two steps as in Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf
(2010). In the first step, we estimate the exponential parameter, λ, through the max-
imum likelihood estimation. Here follows the way to construct the likelihood function
for the first step estimation.
The contribution of an individual’s default to the likelihood, conditional on αi, is
Pr(mi = (ti, di)|α, λ) = Pr(t = ti|α, λ)diPr(t ≥ ti|α, λ)1−di
= (s(α, λ))di(S(α, λ))1−di
where, S(α, λ) = exp[−αλt], and s(α, λ) = ∂S(α, λ)
∂t
under the exponential hazard
distribution.
Then, the log likelihood of the default outcome is computed by integrating equa-
tion above over unobserved individual heterogeneity, α, and adding up all individuals.
Again, note that we assume that F (α, γ) follows a bivariate lognormal distribution.











By maximizing the equation (3.2), we get λ̂, µ̂α, and σ̂α. Here, we can recover
parameters of the mixed proportional hazard model only from data on default outcome,
since we use mixed proportional hazard model as default process and assume the process
is exogenous.
And then, in the second step, we recover the parameters of the bivariate lognormal
distribution using data on consumers’ loan type choice and their default outcome.
First, the probability of choosing a specific type of loan conditional on individual





Vν(b0, w0;α, λ, γ))dFγ|α(γ|α)
where, 1(·) is an indicator function.
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In order to calculate the above probability, here we define γ∗(α, λ) such that
Vν=0(b0, w0;α, λ, γ
∗(α, λ)) = Vν=1(b0, w0;α, λ, γ∗(α, λ))
Note that ν = 0 indicates a credit loan while ν = 1 indicates a collateralized loan. So,
γ∗(α, λ) indicates the threshold level of inter-temporal elasticity which makes the value
indifferent between choosing a credit loan and a collateralized loan, given individual
unobserved default risk, αi.
As we mentioned before, if all other conditions are the same, consumers with low
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, i.e. with high γ, tend to choose a credit loan.
Therefore, we can set γ∗(α, λ) such as,
if γ ∈

[0, γ∗(α, λ)) : choose a collateralized loan
[γ∗(α, λ),∞) : choose a credit loan
We estimate the function γ∗(α, λ) numerically by solving the dynamic program of
individual loan type choice (Equation (3.1)). And please refer to Figure 3.1 for the
numerically estimated graph of γ∗(α, λ).
In turn, we can recover the conditional probability of a consumer’s choice of loan
type using the above γ∗(α, λ).
Pr(νi|α, λ) =

Fγ|α(γ∗(α, λ)) : if a consumer chooses a collateralized loan
1− Fγ|α(γ∗(α, λ)) : if a consumer chooses a credit loan
Since we assume that the joint distribution of F (α, γ) is a bivariate lognormal
distribution,




where, µγ|α = µγ + (
σαγ
σ2α





























)dα) : ν = 1∑N
i=1 log(
∫





)dα) : ν = 0
By maximizing the full likelihood function, we can recover the bivariate lognormal
distribution of unobserved individual default risk and inter-temporal elasticity of sub-
stitution.18
Results
Table 3.2 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of the bivariate lognormal distribu-
tion. First, the mean of the estimate for the parameter γ is




Mathematically, inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) equals the minus of the
inverse of the elasticity of the marginal utility:




1− η(1− γ) = 0.61
This estimate of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is larger than the esti-
mate of Hall (1988), but is less than the estimate of Attanasio and Weber (1993).
Also the estimation results show that there is statistically significant negative as-
sociation between default risk and consumption smoothing motive that is inversely
proportional to the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution: ρ = −0.368.
This negative correlation is tightly consistent to the results in the previous chapters.
In this market, I find evidence of advantageous selection in the previous chapters.
18Further details of estimation is provided in Appendix C.1
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This advantageous selection is based on the fact that consumer who have stronger
consumption smoothing motives have higher opportunity cost of being excluded from
the credit market so they exert more effort to prevent default. In sum, if default leads
to exclusion from the credit market, there is negative association between consumption
smoothing motives and default risks. Here, I assume that the default hazard rate does
not depend on the choice of the loan type. However, it still can depend on the individual
preference, in this case consumption smoothing motives.
Finally, there are significant variations both in private information on default risks
and private information on consumption smoothing motives. Statistically significant
σα and σγ reveal these facts. Also, we can graphically check the dispersion in Figure
3.2 and Figure 3.3.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is one of the key parameters in
economic models. The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption reflects
households’ willingness to substitute consumption between time periods in response to
changes in the expected real interest rate. Therefore, it represents a crucial parameter
for a wide range of economic models involving inter-temporal choice; modeling the
behavior of aggregate savings and modeling the impact of fiscal policy.
In this paper, we try to estimate inter-temporal elasticity of substitution using a
dataset including choices of a loan type and related outcome on default. Consumer
credit markets provide a fascinating environment to estimate inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution since inter-temporal consumption smoothing is the primary reason to
join the consumer credit markets. Furthermore, we estimate its joint distribution with
default risks.
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution matters when consumers choose the type of
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a loan, especially when the bank has market power. Consumers with low inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution, i.e. with stronger consumption smoothing motives, are willing
to pay a higher interest rate to reduce the collateral requirement by one unit. So if
every other conditions are equal, then they tend to choose a credit loan that charges a
higher interest rate instead of requiring any collateral to be pledged.
Following the intuition, we develop a structural econometric model to estimate inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution, private default risk, and their correlation structure
from the data on choices of a loan type and default outcome in the consumer credit
market.
The estimated inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is about 0.61, which is larger
than Hall (1988)’s result, but is less than Attanasio and Weber (1993)’s result. Also
the estimation results show that there is a strong and statistically significant positive
correlation between default risks and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
This positive correlation is tightly consistent with the results in the previous chap-
ters. In this market, I find evidence of advantageous selection in the first chapter.
This advantageous selection is based on the fact that consumer who have stronger con-
sumption smoothing motives have higher opportunity cost of being excluded from the
credit market so they exert more effort to prevent default as I showed in the second
chapter. In sum, if default leads to exclusion from the credit market, there is a positive
association between inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and default risks.
Finally, we can confirm that there are significant variations both in private informa-
tion on default risks and private information on consumption smoothing motives from
the results of the structural estimation.
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Table 3.1: Interest Rate Gap between Credit Loans and Collateralized
Loans
Consumer Loans OLS
Dependent Variable Loan Interest Rate




Allow Full Interactions Yes
Adaptive lasso has been used to pick the relevant conditional variables.
Observations 14,480
Notes: Table reports the least squares estimates. Credit ratings includes all the credit
rating variables that the bank uses when pricing the loans. It includes credit score
and credit class which is provided by a third party credit rating company, and also
includes behavior score and first score which are rated by the bank itself. Consumer
characteristics includes income, occupation, location, real estate, previous bank loan
amount, number of previous loans, and whether she is the owner or the renter of her
house. I allow full interaction among the covariates and use adaptive lasso to pick the
relevant variables.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.2: Parameter Estimates of the Bi-
variate Lognormal Distribution










Notes: Table reports the maximum likelihood es-
timates. Each parameter is the parameter of the
















* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 3.3: Estimated Joint Distribution of γ and α
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Conclusion
My dissertation focuses on the multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity of each bor-
rowers in the consumer credit market. Under this multidimensional private information,
the first and the second chapter reveal the full mechanism of advantageous selection,
showing that this advantageous selection can be explained by combination of private
information on consumption smoothing motives and the bank’s market power.
On the demand side, consumers who have stronger consumption smoothing motives
are willing to pay higher interest rates to smooth consumption. At the same time, they
exert more effort to prevent default since their opportunity cost of being excluded from
the credit market is higher. On the supply side, sufficient market power allows the
bank to charge higher interest rates to the borrowers who are willing to pay more for
consumption smoothing.
By separately identifying moral hazard from adverse selection, I explicitly support
the theoretical argument that consumers with stronger consumption smoothing motives
do indeed exert more effort to prevent default, generating the endogenous negative
association between consumption smoothing motives and default risks.
These results are complemented by the structural estimation in the last chapter. By
constructing and estimating dynamic model of loan type choices, I and Gustavo Pereira
recover the joint distribution of private information on default risk and consumption
smoothing motives that is represented by inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. The
estimated joint distribution reveals a strong and significant positive correlation between
default risks and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. Also it gives a meaningful
value of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
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Finally, I would like to emphasize that an additional dimension should be selected
according to each specific context. Here, I focus on the unobserved heterogeneity in
consumption smoothing motives as an additional dimension of private information,
since consumption smoothing is the main reason of joining the consumer credit market.
On the other hand, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) focus on the taste for insurance in
the Long-Term Care Insurance Market, while Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) focus
on the cognitive ability as an additional dimension of private information in the Medigap
Insurance Market. They also do not argue that those additional dimensions of private
information are the uniquely relevant dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity in their
markets, which implies that there may be multiple dimensions of relevant unobserved
heterogeneity in some markets.
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Appendix A
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A.1 Heterogeneous Opportunity Cost of Default
I use a simple two-period model to show that a consumer with lower IES, implying
stronger consumption smoothing motives, has a higher opportunity cost of being ex-
cluded from the credit market. In other words, I will show that a consumer with low
IES is more willing to pay to join the credit market.
The basic steps and ideas are following. In the first step, I will show that the optimal
borrowing amount is decreasing in the IES. That is to say, a consumer with low IES
tends to borrow more from a bank at any given loan interest rate. And in the second
step, more directly, I will show that the compensating income variation for which the
consumer is indifferent to remain in autarky is larger for the consumer with lower IES.
Suppose the income of a consumer in period 1 is y1 and y2 > y1 in period 2. Unless
the interest rate, R = 1 + r, is too high, the consumer will borrow money and try to





s.t. c1 = y1 + b
c2 = y2 −Rb
The first order condition is,
∂V
∂b
= u′(y1 + b∗)−Ru′(y2 −Rb∗) = 0 (A.1)
Suppose the consumer has iso-elastic utility function: u(ct) =
c1−γt − 1
1− γ . One can
easily show that if the cross partial derivative of the objective function with respect to





= −(y1 + b)−γ log(y1 + b) +R(y2 −Rb)−γ log(y2 −Rb)









−γ logR > 0
The last equality follows from the first order condition. Solving the first order




Here, let’s define a threshold interest rate R∗ which induces b = 0, no borrowing
point. Then, R∗ = (
y2
y1
)γ increases as γ increases. It means that a consumer with lower
IES is willing to pay higher interest cost to join the credit market.
Now, I will show that the amount of compensating income variation, d, for which
the consumer is indifferent to remain in autarky is larger for the consumer with lower
IES. The steps are following.
1. find the utility V , of a consumer who is allowed to smooth consumption through
the credit market
2. find the compensating income variation, d for the consumer to be indifferent
whether to remain in autarky or to join the credit market without any compen-
sation.




From the equation (A.1), I can get the optimal borrowing amount b∗ and the max-
imized value becomes,
V = u(y1 + b
∗) + u(y2 −Rb∗)
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Now let’s consider the same consumer who is not allowed to join the credit market
(Autarky). And let’s set the compensation income d that makes the consumer to be
indifferent whether to remain in autarky or to join the credit market without any
compensation.
u(y1 + d) + u(y2 + d) = u(y1 + b
∗) + u(y2 −Rb∗) = V
Using the first order Taylor approximation,
u(y1) + u


































First note that b∗ ≥ 0, when γ ≥ logR
log(y2/y1)
≡ γ∗. Consumers with high enough
IES do not join the loan market since they prefer to consume more in the second period
rather than to smooth consumption. Also it is easy to check that whenever b∗ ≥ 0,





































The result implies that a consumer with low IES needs higher income compensation
d to be indifferent whether to remain in autarky or to join the credit market without
any compensation. In sum, consumers with low IES have higher opportunity cost of
being excluded from the credit market.
141
A.2 Validity of the proxy for Consumption
Smoothing Motives
To directly show that unobserved heterogeneity in consumption smoothing motives,
of which IES is used as a shortcut in a theoretical point of view, is the source of
advantageous selection, I construct a proxy for IES using the credit card consumption
pattern and balance in the savings account.
A set of consumers who
1. have outstanding debt, therefore cannot borrow anymore
2. have zero or small balance in their savings account
3. have upward savings trend or increasing income path
4. use the installment plan
is regarded as a group of consumers who have strong consumption smoothing motives,
and I call them “consumption smoothing group”. Just to clarify, consumers in the
consumption smoothing group should satisfy all three conditions.
Here I prove the validity of the proxy for consumption smoothing motives through
a simple two period model. Again, IES is used as a shortcut representing heterogenous
consumption smoothing motives in a theoretical perspective.
Suppose a consumer with borrowing constraint (b ≤ 0 in the model). The only way
she can smooth consumption is to save or to join the installment plan by purchasing
goods using a credit card. Suppose her income in period 1 is y1 and y2 > y1 in the
second period. Let R = 1+r denotes the monthly gross interest from borrowing, and rI
denotes an interest rate imposed to the monthly installment. Note that the installment
interest rate is higher than the borrowing rate, rI > r.
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I + c1 = y1 + b










c1 ≥ 0 , cI1 ≥ 0 , c2 ≥ 0
Here ct is regular consumption in period t which includes purchasing by cash and
by credit cards without the installment plan. And cI1 is consumption by the installment
plan in period 1. From now on, for convenience, let’s assume the consumer has iso-
elastic utility function.





































The first order conditions become,















− (1 + 2r
I)
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+ λ1 − λ2 +Rλ4 = 0
143
Also complementary slackness conditions are
1. λ1 ≥ 0 and λ1b = 0




3. λ3 ≥ 0 and λ3cI1 = 0




Note that the objective function is concave and the constraint set is compact, so
the maximization program has a unique maximum. The maximum point depends on
the parameter values. Under some parameter values, the maximum point may be
characterized by c1 = 0 or c2 = 0. However, here I exclude those candidates since no
one indeed does in my dataset. In other words, I only consider parameter values within
a reasonable set which excludes no regular consumption, c1 = 0 or c2 = 0, in each
period.




, and R, there exists a threshold point γ∗ such that if γ > γ∗, then cI1 > 0





> 0, when cI1 > 0 at the maximum point.
Now let’s solve the program.
1. Suppose b < 0 and cI1 > 0, then λi = 0 ∀i = 1, 2, 3, 4.1
The first order conditions imply R =
1 + rI
1− 2rI . It means that only when R =
1 + r =
1 + rI
1− 2rI , all choice variables are positive at the maximum. Noting that
r < rI , R = 1 + r is always less than 1 + rI . So this cannot be the maximum
point.
1Again, note that I only consider the case c1 > 0 and c2 > 0.
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2. Suppose b = 0 and cI1 > 0, then λi = 0 ∀i = 2, 3, 4.






(1− 2rI) + (1 + rI)K (A.2)




Note that cI1 > 0, only when K >
y1
y2
. This condition gives the threshold γ∗ in
which if γ > γ∗, then cI1 > 0, otherwise c
I
1 = 0.































[(1− 2rI) + y1
y2
(1 + rI)]
[(1− 2rI) + (1 + rI)K]2
Since monthly installment interest rate (rI) is in between 0.83% ∼ 1.78%,
















1− 2rI ). Note that
1 + rI
1− 2rI > 1.
The result implies that a consumer with low IES tends to use installment plan





3. Suppose b = 0 and cI1 = 0, which implies Autarky economy. In this case, c1 = y1
and c2 = y2.
4. Suppose b < 0 and cI1 = 0, then λi = 0 ∀i = 1, 3, 4. In this case, from the first
order conditions
b = −y1 −Ny2
NR + 1
where, N = [
2
{1 + rI +R(1 + 2rI)} ]
1/γ < 1.












, then b < 0 only when γ < γ∗∗.
It is not difficult to verify that γ∗ > γ∗∗.
In conclusion,
• when γ > γ∗,
cI1 =
2(y2)K − 2y1
(1− 2rI) + (1 + rI)K > 0




• when γ ≤ γ∗,
cI1 = 0
Especially when γ∗∗ ≤ γ ≤ γ∗, cI1 = 0 and also b = 0, i.e. autarky economy.
• when γ < γ∗∗, then still
cI1 = 0
and b = −y1 −Ny2
NR + 1
< 0, save for the future.
The intuition behind the savings behavior of a consumer with very high IES, i.e.
a consumer with very low γ, is simple. Let’s consider an extreme case. Consider a
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consumer with γ = 0, i.e. the infinite IES. At the optimum, the consumer chooses to
save all the income in period 1, b = −y1, unless β is too small. It is because she has
a linear utility function, therefore, she saves all the income in the first period to gain
interest from the saving, and will spend all in the second period.
In sum, the result implies that a consumer with low IES tends to use installment
plan more than a consumer with high IES if their income paths are the same.
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Loan Type (Line Color)
Credit Loans
Collateralized Loans






Interest Rate Plot on Credit Score (Corporate Loans)
The above plot is the interest rate plot on credit score for corporate loans. There
are several notable features. First, on average, the loan interest rate is higher for the
credit loans than for the collateralized loans. Second, The interest rates of both credit
loans and collateralized loans decrease as the credit score increases since bank charges
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higher rate to the firms with lower credit score. The formula for the loan interest rate
can explain these features.
Loan Interest Rate = Internal Rate + Tax + Credit Risk Cost + Profit
The loan interest rate is decomposed into internal rate, tax, credit risk cost, and profit.
Among them, credit risk cost is the source of two features.
Credit Risk Cost = Expected Default Rate× (1 - Recovery Rate)
As you can see in the above equation, credit risk cost is composed of expected default
rate, which is calculated based on credit score of each consumer, and (1- Recovery
Rate). So if everything else is equal, as the credit score increases the loan interest rate
decreases since decreased expected default rate lower the credit risk cost. While, if
everything else is equal, recovery rate is lower for credit loans, which leads to a higher
















Loan Type (Line Color)
Credit Loans
Collateralized Loans






Interest Rate Plot on Credit Score (Consumer Loans)
The above plot is the interest rate plot on credit score for consumer loans. Note
that the interest rates of credit loans significantly decrease as the credit score increases
while those of collateralized loans almost stay the same. It is because, for consumer
loans, approved amounts of collateralized loans are usually less than the value of col-
lateral, indicating full recovery even when a consumer defaults. With full recovery,
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credit score does not affect to the interest rate much.2 Also note that there are several
loans with a very low interest rate which are only offered to specific group of borrowers,
e.g. employees by government or by major companies etc., implying that it is im-
portant to condition on individual occupations while empirically detecting asymmetric
information.
2Again, the formula for the loan interest rate is as follows.
Loan Interest Rate = Internal Rate + Tax + Credit Risk Cost + Profit
And the credit risk cost does not depend much on expected default rate if recovery rate is close to 1.
Note the formula for the credit risk cost below.
Credit Risk Cost = Expected Default Rate× (1 - Recovery Rate)
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
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B.1 The Model for Negative Occurrence
Dependence and Negative Lagged Duration
Dependence
Occurrence dependence is a causal relationship in that occurrence of delinquency changes
the incentives of a borrower, in turn, changes the probability of future delinquency.
Here I try to show that, under convex penalty scheme, if a consumer can change the
probability of delinquency by exerting effort, then there should be negative occurrence
dependence.
Let me consider a borrower who contracts a loan and receives stochastic flow of
income. The borrower may choose to postpone repayment for which I am going to call
delinquency. Several model primitives are following.
Model Primitives and Assumptions
1. The contract is composed of (L, T, rt,mt), where L is loan amount, T is maturity,
rt is an yearly interest rate, mt is monthly due amount. Of course, the monthly
due amountmt is determined by L, T, rt, and the delinquency status of a borrower.
2. Consumer’s instantaneous utility is u(vt, ct). Utility comes from two arguments,
the value of durables, vt, which can also be used as collateral (like house or car)
and non-durable consumption, ct. Here I assume u(vt, ct) is strictly concave,
increasing, and twice continuously differentiable in the 2nd argument. Also I
assume limct→0 u(vt, ct) = −∞ and Inada type condition on the second argument.
a) u2(vt, ct) > 0
b) u22(vt, ct) < 0
c) lim
ct→0




u2(vt, ct) = 0
3. The income follows a process yt = y0 + et + ηt, where y0 is determined from
personal own characteristics, et is costly effort, and ηt is stochastic part which is
identically and independently distributed across time with Eηt = 0.
4. Γ(et) is the cost of effort et. Assume that Γ is strictly convex, increasing, and
twice continuously differentiable.
a) Γ′(et) > 0
b) Γ′′(et) > 0
5. The value of durables at period 0, v0, is given; vt depreciates at a constant rate δ
so that vt = (1− δ)vt−1.
6. Consumers cannot contract an additional loan during the contract period. I also
abstract from savings, which is arguably restrictive.1
Time Line
1. At date t, a consumer chooses a level of effort e∗t which depends on d
t−1, the whole
history of delinquency until time period t− 1.
2. ηt is drawn from the distribution, i.e. the monthly income yt realizes.
3. After the income realizes a consumer chooses whether to be delinquent or not.
Moral Hazard
To define the case without moral hazard, let’s think of a specific costly effort function:
Γ(et) =

0, if et ≤ e0
∞, if et > e0
1Actually, consumers in my dataset do not save much.
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Then, a consumer always chooses his effort level e∗t = e0.
Without moral hazard, the consumer repays whenever he can. So without moral
hazard, y∗t is irrelevant. As a result, given e
∗
t = e0, a consumer repays monthly due
amount whenever his monthly income realizes not less than the due amount (mt).
With moral hazard, however, consumer optimizes his own value function and deter-
mines the optimal effort level e∗t . And then the consumer optimally chooses whether to
be delinquent or not. In this context it is easy to see that there is negative occurrence
dependence if (y∗t − e∗t ) decreases as the number of past delinquencies increases. Like-
wise, there is negative lagged duration dependence if (y∗t −e∗t ) decreases as the duration
of past delinquencies increases.
Bellman Equation







Here, Vt(vt, yt,mt, et, d
t−1), which is explicitly defined below, is the value function
by optimally choose delinquency status at period t after the realization of ηt, i.e. the
realization of current income yt. Note that once we condition on et(d
t−1), yt does not













t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))}
(B.2)
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If the cumulative number of days being delinquent reached to 90 days at the decision
period t, the consumer loses collateral and at the same time loses all kinds of credits







t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
, u(vt, yt(d





t , yt) = Et[
∞∑
τ=0
βτu(vDt+τ , yt+τ )]
vDt+τ = 0 for securitized loans, and v
D
t+τ = vt+τ for credit loans.







βτ−1u(vT+τ , cT+τ )
Here, cT+τ is the consumption path when the consumer can still participate the financial
market.
After the income, yt, realizes a consumer chooses whether to be delinquent or not.
Let us set y∗t as a threshold level of income that the consumer is indifferent whether to




t −mt(dt−1)) + βEtVt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
= u(vt, y
∗
t ) + βEtVt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))
(B.4)
2If a borrower is delinquent in the last period T, he needs to repay the debt in the next period.




There exists a threshold income y∗t , such that a consumer optimizes to be delinquent
if yt < y
∗
t , otherwise repays the monthly due amount. Furthermore,
y∗t (βEt[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
−Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))])
is decreasing in the argument.
Proof.
y∗t satisfies the below equation which comes from the equation (B.4)
u(vt, y
∗
t )− u(vt, y∗t −mt(dt−1)) (B.5)
= βEt[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))−
Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))]
• Existence
First, by the strict increasing concavity in the 2nd argument of u(vt, ct) and the
optimality of e∗t+1(d
t−1, dt = 0), it is easy to see that
EtVt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
> EtVt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))
> EtVt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))
And note that u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt) is continuous in yt.
Since u(vt, yt) is twice continuously differentiable in the 2nd argument,
u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt) = u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt)− u2(vt, c∗t )(−mt) = mtu2(vt, c∗t )
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[u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt)] = 0
Also since limct→0 u(vt, ct) = −∞, it is easy to show that
lim
yt→mt
[u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt)] = +∞
In sum,
1. u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt) is continuous in yt.
2. limyt→+∞[u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt)] = 0.
3. limyt→mt [u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt)] = +∞.
4. EtVt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0)
> EtVt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))
These four facts give the existence of y∗t ∈ (mt,+∞).
• Uniqueness
Uniqueness directly comes from the strict concavity of u(vt, ct) in the 2nd argu-
ment. Suppose there exists y∗t 6= y∗∗t such that
u(vt, y
∗
t )− u(vt, y∗t −mt)
= βEt[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))−
Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))]
u(vt, y
∗∗
t )− u(vt, y∗∗t −mt)
= βEt[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))−
Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))]
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Since u22(vt, ct) < 0
∂/∂yt[u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt)] = u2(vt, yt)− u2(vt, yt −mt)
= u2(vt, yt)− [u2(vt, yt) + u22(vt, c∗∗t )(−mt)]
= u22(vt, c
∗∗
t )mt < 0
where, c∗∗t ∈ (yt −mt, yt)
So, if y∗t 6= y∗∗t ,
u(vt, y
∗
t )− u(vt, y∗t −mt) 6= u(vt, y∗∗t )− u(vt, y∗∗t −mt)
Contradiction.
• Property
Now let’s focus on proving
y∗t (βEt[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
−Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))])
is increasing in the argument.
Since, ∂/∂yt[u(vt, yt)− u(vt, yt −mt)] < 0, if RHS of equation (B.5), which is the
argument itself, increases then y∗t decreases.
As I showed in Proposition C.1, if
Et[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
−Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))]
increases as the number of past delinquencies and/or duration of past delinquencies
increases.
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In turn, it means y∗t decreases as the past number of delinquencies increases. I insist,
under the convex penalty scheme and if marginal cost of increasing effort level is high
enough then
Et[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
−Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))]
increases as the number of past delinquencies and/or duration of past delinquencies
increases.4
As a result, optimal income threshold y∗t (d
t−1) is decreasing in the number of past
delinquencies and/or duration of past delinquencies.
Now, let’s focusing on the optimal effort problem of the consumer.
Proposition C.2.
The optimal effort level, e∗t (d
t−1), increases as the past number of delinquencies
and/or the past duration of delinquencies increases when mt is relatively small.
proof.
4Note that as the number of past delinquencies changes, all future optimal level of effort also
changes. If this change is large,
Et[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0))
−Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1))]
may not increase in d even under convex penalty scheme. To prevent those result, here I assume the















t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0),
et+1(d







t−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),
et+1(d
t−1, dt = 1), (dt−1, dt = 1))]f(ηt)dηt
−Γ(et) (B.6)
Using the Leibniz rule, first order condition of equation (B.6) becomes,
Γ′(e∗t ) = f(y
∗
t − y0 − e∗t )[{u(vt, y∗t −mt(dt−1))− u(vt, y∗t )}
+ βEt[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0),
et+1(d
t−1, dt = 0), (dt−1, dt = 0))
− Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),
et+1(d




u2(vt, y0 + e
∗




u2(vt, y0 + e
∗
t + ηt)f(ηt)dηt
From equation (B.5), we know that
u(vt, y
∗
t −mt(dt−1))− u(vt, y∗t )
+ βEt[Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(d
t−1, dt = 0),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 0), et+1(dt−1, dt = 0), (dt−1, dt = 0))
− Vt+1(vt+1, yt+1(dt−1, dt = 1),mt+1(dt−1, dt = 1), et+1(dt−1, dt = 1), (dt−1, dt = 1))] = 0
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u2(vt, y0 + e
∗




u2(vt, y0 + e
∗
t + ηt)f(ηt)dηt (B.7)
Now using the implicit function theorem,




u22(vt, y0 + e
∗









= −{u2(vt, y∗t −mt)− u2(vt, y∗t )}f(y∗t − y0 − e∗t )
Note that
1. Γ′′(e∗t ) > 0
2. {u2(vt, y∗t −mt)− u2(vt, y∗t )}f(y∗t − y0 − e∗t ) > 0





u22(vt, y0 + e
∗




u22(vt, y0 + e
∗
t + ηt)f(ηt)dηt





If mt is relatively small, inequality (B.8) is satisfied.
q.e.d
The intuition behind the need of relatively small mt is that effort reduces the utility
not only in case of well-repayed but also in case of delinquency, so that a risk averse con-
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sumers facing high mt may opt for increasing his worst-case income instead of reducing
the probability of delinquency.
In sum, as the number and/or duration of past delinquencies increases, y∗t decreases
by Proposition 1, and e∗t increases by Proposition 2.
As a result,
max{y∗t ,mt} − e∗t








Following Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010), the estimation of the joint distribu-
tion of default risk and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is done in two steps.
In the first step, we recover the exponential hazard parameter using only from data on
default outcome.
Afterwards, we do a second round of maximum likelihood estimation using the
choices of a loan type and related default outcome.
For the first step, we use a dataset including the outcome of default. The outcome of
default is composed of mi = (ti, di), where ti denotes the time until the last observation
period whether due to default, due to completion of the contract, or censored. And di
is an indicator for default for individual i.
di =

1 : if defaults.
0 : non-default, including censored.
Conditional on her unobservable default risk α, the contribution of individual i to
the likelihood is given by
Pr(mi = (ti, di)|α, λ) = Pr(t = ti|α, λ)di Pr(t ≥ ti|α, λ)1−di
= (s(α, λ))di(S(α, λ))1−di
where λ is a common default hazard parameter. The functions s and S are respectively
the exponential density and exponential survival functions, given by
s(α, λ, ti) = −λαe−λαti
S(α, λ, ti) = e
−λαti
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Based on these primitives, the expression for the likelihood function used in the first
step is











To integrate out the individual unobserved heterogeneity, α, we apply a Gauss-
Chebyshev quadrature integration method using the change of variables.
x ≡ (log(α)− µα)/σα
which follows a standard normal distribution. Note that we assume a bivariate nor-
mal distribution on the joint distribution of individual unobserved hazard and inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution.
We obtain 20 nodes of the standard normal between [−2.1, 2.1] thus covering a mass





mi = (ti, di)|λ, eσαxj+µα
)
where wj are the Gauss-Chebyshev weights, xj are the nodes and φ denotes the standard
normal density function.
We employ an interior solution algorithm through Artelys Knitro’s MATLAB im-
plementation in order to maximize the above full likelihood over λ, µα and σα.
The second step relies computing the function γ∗(λ, α) which returns the (inverse)
IES for which the individual is indifferent between a credit and colletarlized loan. Drop-
ping unrelated variables, we find
Vν=0(b0, w0;α, λ, γ
∗(α, λ)) = Vν=1(b0, w0;α, λ, γ∗(α, λ)) (C.1)
where, ν = 0 indicates a credit loan while ν = 1 indicates a collateralized loan.
The details of the computation of Vcred and Vcol are deferred to the following subsec-
tion. The likelihood of the parameters µ = (µα, µγ) and Σ = (σα, σγ, ρα,γ) is computed
through the following steps:
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1. fix λ to the value estimated in the first step.
2. solve Equation C.1 for a finite grid of α, using MATLAB’s solver fsolve, thus
obtaining pairs {(α1, γ∗1), . . . , (αK , γ∗K))}.
3. approximate the function γ∗ by linearly interpolating {γ∗k} over the α grid.






Vν(b0, w0;α, λ, γ))dFγ|α(γ|α)
=

Fγ|α(γ∗(α, λ)) if νi = collateralized loan
1− Fγ|α(γ∗(α, λ)) if νi = credit loan
where,




with µγ|α = µγ + (
σαγ
σ2α


















where, µγ|α = µγ + (
σαγ
σ2α






The integral is again computed through a Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature method
with the same nodes, weights and change of variables.




The value function for the loans is computed through the first order conditions. Specif-
ically, in order to solve for






at(α)u(ct, d0) + ft(α)V
Au(bt, wt, d0(1− νζ))
}
+ βT+1aT (α)V
gf (bT+1, wT+1, d0)
subject to wealth evolution,
bt+1 = Rbt + wt − ct − Fµ
For the wage process we assume,
wt = δ
tw0 + (1− δt)w¯
where, the parameters w0 and w¯ respectively represent the “initial” and the “long term”
wage.
We fix c0 and use the first order conditions of the problem to generate recursions
{ct, ψt, bt+1}Tt=1 such that
−ψt = at(α)uc(ct, d0)
ψt+1 = ψt + βft+1(α)∂bV
Au(bt+1, wt+1, d0(1− νζ))
bt+1 = Rbt + wt − Fν − ct
Computing the value of the above consumption/debt path, we get a function
Vν(c0; b0, w0)
which we then maximize over c0.
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C.2 Calibration
The calibrated parameters were the Cobb-Douglas weight of non-durable consumption
η, the monthly discount factor β and the interest rate R. We use a monthly value of
0.9763 for the discount factor, which corresponds to an annualized discount factor of
around 0.998. With our assumption that βR = 1, this implies a yearly savings interest
rate of around 2.4%, a value that roughly matches interest rates in those years for the
Korean economy. The parameter η is set to 0.8. Changes in this parameter have little
impact on the estimated cut-off γ∗(α, λ).
We also set the initial and long term wages to reasonable values for the individuals
in the sample: initial monthly wage is set to one thousand dollars, long term wage to
three thousand dollars, and the increase speed parameter δ is such that the midpoint
between long run and initial wage is attained in 10 years. The fixed payments of the
collateralized and credit loans are set to quantitatively match the observed loan interest
rates in the data.
Parameter Meaning Value
β Discount factor 0.9763
R Gross interest rate 1.002
η Cobb-Douglas weight on non-durable utility 0.8
w0 Initial wage 2000
w¯ Long term wage 6000
δ Wage increase parameter 0.9942
Fcoll Fixed payment for collateralized loan 160
Fcred Fixed payment for credit loan 252
Tcoll Loan maturity for collateralized loans 120 month
Tcred Loan maturity for credit loans 60 month
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